英 文 翻 译
姓 名：王婵娟
学 号：1102090218
指导教师：白芙蓉
专 业：工程管理
班 级：1102班
时 间：2015年4月25日
工 程 管 理 系
工程管理系
英文翻译评价表
注：此表与翻译文本一起装订
英文原文
Title ：Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn? Kenneth W. Soyeh & Jonathan A. Wiley & Ken H. Johnson
Published online: 31 October 2012
# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012
Abstract
The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn.The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The benefit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount.
【Key words】Incentives; Brokerage; Residential;Transactions ;Overpricing
Introduction
In mid-2010, the Wall Street Journal reported a nationwide inventory excess in the U.S. housing markets of approximately 2.4 million units (Whelan 2010). The home ownership vacancy rate at the same point in time was 2.6 % for the nation. This was within 30 basis points of the highest level of vacancy since tracking this statistic began in 1956.1 There is no evidence that the effects of this recent supply shock have lessened in scale since then. Is it possible that this scale of excess supply of housing units intensifies competition among sellers and limits the potential benefits from aggressive pricing strategies and other buyer incentives?
The purpose of this study is to directly investigate this question. A better understanding of the efficacy of buyer incentives should help significantly as the nation’s excess housing inventory is cleared from the market. More specifically in this study, the impact of home seller incentives on marketing outcomes is examined using a sample of transactions from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) dataset
in Boca Raton, Florida. The focus in this study is on the use of incentives offered by sellers directly to homebuyers, which are individually identified in the data collection. The primary interest is on the effectiveness of incentives and their ability to impact both property transaction price and property duration span. The sample period covers 2009 through 2011, which coincides with depressed real estate conditions in the subject market and is similar to market conditions around the country at the same time. Incentives for homebuyers come in a number of forms, including financing premiums,closing costs, credits for repairs, homeowner association (HOA) fees, home warranties, and others that include perks which are unrelated to the financing. The expected impact depends on which premium is proposed.
Financing premiums include interest rate buy-downs, such as discount points, or below-market financing in the form of assumable mortgages and seller financing. Potential homebuyers who use debt financing may be willing to pay a higher price for a property with financing premiums included, up to the amount of their individual valuation for that premium and subject to constraints of increased cash requirements for settlement at a higher price. An individual valuation of the financing premium will be less than the cost to the seller when the buyer has a household cost of capital that is greater than the interest cost on the mortgage debt or when the individual does not expect to hold the property for the duration of the mortgage term; both of which are likely to be the case given that mortgage debt is typically the lowest cost source of capital for a household and the expected holding period is often less than the term of the standard mortgage instrument. For these reasons, financing premiums are not expected to be fully capitalized into the selling price. If a seller offering financing premiums as incentives does not require a higher price, then the financing premium should result in a reduction in the expected marketing duration. The required price by the seller can be signaled through the listing price. If the listing price is increased substantially in combination with the financing premium, then the potential impact to the marketing duration is reduced in exchange for an attempt to capitalize the financing premium into the transaction price. The utility of the financing premium for buyers can be valuable during periods of high interest rates. However, weakened real estate market conditions tend to coincide with periods of low interest rates, which limits the potential effectiveness of financing premiums during real estate downturns. For the sample considered in this study, financing premiums do not appear to be offered at all as incentives for potential homebuyers.
By comparison, when a seller offers to pay some portion of the buyer’s closing costs, that amount is delivered at closing and undiscounted so that its valuation does not rely on an individual buyer ’s
discount rate. In addition, prospective homebuyers who do not use debt financing in the home purchase can benefit from the cash payment at closing. The benefit from closing costs is immediate and independent of the interest rate environment with appeal to a broader base of potential homebuyers, providing this concession with distinct advantages during weakened market conditions. During healthy market conditions, there is the potential to fully capitalize closing costs paid by the seller into the selling price when there are buyers who are constrained by the settlement cash required for closing. When the seller does not require that the closing costs are fully capitalized, the immediate cash advantage is available to all potential homebuyers and expected to reduce the marketing duration.During a downturn, there is increased price competition among sellers and it can be more difficult or impractical to price aggressively in an attempt to capitalize closing cost concessions —in which case the expected impact shifts to shorten the marketing duration for properties that are priced competitively.
Credits offered for repairs are often associated with deferred maintenance properties and those repairs may be necessary to obtain a competitive selling price. When the repair credits are appropriate to the necessary adjustment, the impact on price should be zero although marketing duration may be extended relative to properties that do not suffer from deferred maintenance.
HOA fees are similar to financing premiums in the sense that the valuation depends on the individual buyer, however the impact is expected to be much smaller since the offer is typically for the seller to pay HOA fees over a very short term, for example 1 or 2 years rather than for the life of the mortgage loan. If contributions toward HOA fees are offered in communities where fees are relatively high, then the expected impact is to achieve a similar price relative to competitive properties in communities where HOA fees are lower, rather than to sell at a higher price or reduce marketing durations.
Home warranties and many other perquisites, including personal property or vacations, can be classified as unrelated to the monthly mortgage payment and the cash required for settlement. These assets are often quite small when expressed as a percentage of the purchase price and can easily be purchased in the private market apart from the residential transaction, so the impact on selling price is limited. Incentives that do not directly relax the payment or settlement cash constraints have limited potential to increase the pool of interested home buyers at a given listing price and would not be expected to significantly reduce marketing duration unless the value of the asset offered is relatively high.
To consider the effectiveness of incentives in a depressed real estate market for the impact on both marketing duration and selling price, a three-stage model is developed to estimate the impact of incentives on price and duration span. In the first stage, the estimation is for the determinants of incentives being offered by sellers, including market conditions. In the second stage, the transaction price is estimated and the impact from the use of incentives is isolated, controlling underlying conditions relating to incentive selection. The third stage estimates the hazard model for marketing duration effects, if any, including the potential impact from incentives. The interaction between incentives and overpricing by sellers is also explored, and incentives are considered in separate categories to identify individual effectiveness.
The contributions of this study are to document that many conventional incentives fail to prove effective during a downmarket, that only closing cost concessions have any reliable impact, and that overpricing a property has the potential to entirely cancel the expected benefit from offering incentives.
A preponderance of the evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the final transaction price; this is in contrast to the findings of Asabere and Huffman (1997) and Johnson et al. (2000) who conclude that seller paid concessions capitalize into the final transaction price when considering outcomes under favorable market conditions, although marketing mduration was not considered in those studies. Ferreira and Sirmans (1989) appears to be the only other study to consider the impact of incentives on marketing duration, although the consideration is for financing premiums which does not appear to be offered by sellers in the low interest rate environment considered in our study. Instead, it is closing cost incentives alone that are found to have an impact and their impact is to significantly shorten marketing spans during a downmarket, rather to affect the transaction price. The advantage to closing cost concessions is that it is a lump-sumat closing potentially expanding to the pool of buyers who are constrained by settlement cash, it potentially benefits all homebuyers including those who do not use debt financing, its valuation does not depend on an individual’s discount factor and the effectiveness is independent of the interest rate environment. Finally, the potential benefit from all incentives is quickly diminished as property listing price exceeds market expected listed price. The interaction between overpricing and incentives has not been previously considered.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section provides background and additional motivation for the study. This is followed with a section on data description and methodology. The last two sections discuss the results and provide concluding comments.
Background and Additional Motivation
In the very competitive market setting in which most sellers find themselves presently, there are three primary ways of attracting potential homebuyers. The first is to price the property competitively. The second method is to offer incentives to brokers. And the third, which remains a relatively unexplored area, is the opportunity for sellers to offer incentives directly to homebuyers. Consideration for the relevance of list price has been examined at length in the real estate economics literature. Related studies find that sellers often signal their motivation through many strategies including, but not limited to, setting the initial list price at or below market value for the property (Benjamin and Chinloy 2000). Along these lines, Haurin (1988) provides evidence that buyers often constrain their search to consider only properties within a narrowly-defined price range and for specific characteristics. The degree of overpricing thins out the volume of traffic from potential buyers and increases the probability of a lengthy marketing period (Springer 1996). A listing price that is too high also reduces the frequency of offers for a property (Green and Vandell 1994). The empirical evidence on whether selling broker incentives reduce marketing duration is mixed. Zorn and Larsen (1986) conducted a study on the incentive effects of flat-fee and percentage commissions for real estate brokers. The authors find that neither a percentage commission nor a flat-flee motivates a broker to increase his or her level of search for a potential buyer. In a related study, Anglin and Arnott (1991) find that the percentage commission contract performs poorly by failing to allocate risk and to provide broker incentives efficiently. They note further that a percentage commission influences a broker to expend less effort and bear greater risk. Munneke and Yavas (2001), among others, investigate how the difference in commission structures affects the performance of agents at full-commission firms (i.e., RE/MAX real estate agents) against those in traditional firms. At RE/MAX, brokers pay a fixed fee to the agency for office space, secretarial services and keep the full commission as opposed to splitting the commission with the agency in traditionalm firms. They find that the equilibrium selling price and the expected time it takes to sell a listed property through a full-commission agent and a traditional agent do not differ. Alternatively, Johnson et al. (2008) find that after controlling for self-selection issues properties marketed by full-compensation brokers (i.e. RE/MAX like brokers) sell at a slight premium and in significantly shorter marketing spans. Alternatively, Johnson et al. (2004) find that properties marketed by listing brokers sold at a reduced price and stayed longer on market when the selling brokers were offered
bonus incentives.
The influence of non-cash incentives for brokers to close a deal faster has also been the subject of investigation. Geltner et al. (1991) show that under a finiteduration listing contract, the broker’s search efforts to find a buyer will increase over time. They note that as the contract term declines, the agent’s effort level improves while their incentive to provide complete market information becomes weaker.Waller et al. (2010) share a similar view by advocating that a longer listing contract period given to the listing broker to sell a house will diminish broker effort, reduce search intensity and lead to a longer marketing time. A study by Miceli (1989), on the effects of listing contract length, finds that a limit on the duration of the listing contract can be effective in increasing broker effort. However, the author notes that the limitation brings with it a cost to the seller since the best efforts of the agent might not achieve a sale within the speculated time frame. Brastow et al. (2011) assert that if the listing contract term is too long, the broker may not exert effort until the contract is closer to expiration due to the fact that other contract listings that are about to expire soon might be put on the priority list of the broker.
The few studies that examine incentives offered to potential purchasers directly from sellers tend to focus exclusively on discount points and/or closing costs and how such concessions are capitalized into the selling price of a house. Ferreira and Sirmans (1989) consider financing premiums only and find that their announcement in the listing has a positive impact on the transaction price under favorable market conditions, and impacts only the marketing duration when conditions are not favorable to sellers. Asabere and Huffman (1997) consider both discount points and closing costs in a separate analysis and document that discounts points are capitalized into the selling price, but find no evidence that closing costs have an impact on the selling prices. Johnson et al. (2000) find that the total seller concessions, including both discount points and closing costs together, are entirely capitalized into the contract price. From the discussion in this section, it is apparent that much of literature on incentives has tended to concentrate on incentives to selling brokers with little consensus on their impact. However, the final decision to purchase a property is 38to establish a more direct linkage for the effectiveness of incentives. For the few studies that have focused on this connection, the evidence is for primarily financing premiums offered by sellers, which have lost favor in the present low interest rate environment. The research reported in the present study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of modern incentives when they are most needed, including during depressed market conditions and when
previously evaluated incentives (i.e., financing premiums) are unlikely to work. In addition, this study introduces analysis for the interaction between overpricing and the effectiveness of incentives which previously has not been considered.
Data and Methodology
Data
The data comes from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) in Boca Raton, FL and includes a total of 2,689 observations of sold properties collected from November 15, 2009 through November 15, 2011. The data contains information on property characteristics, location and other seller attributes including, but not limited to, whether the property is a foreclosure, vacant, or the seller is “motivated ”. Table 1 presents variable descriptions and Table 2 presents summary statistics. From the sample, the mean transaction price is $414,689; the mean listing price is $459,055; and the average number of days on the market is 129 from list date to contract date. The average property contains 2,443 heated square feet and 63 % of the properties have a pool.
The variable of interest is Incentives, which is an indicator variable taking a value of one if there are phrases in the agent ’s comments viewable to internet searchers of the MLS referencing seller incentives being offered directly to potential buyers. Examples for the wording of such incentives include statements such as “seller pays closing cost”, “seller will offer credit for repairs”, “Association Fees to be paid by seller”, “seller offers home warranty assistance”, or “vacation trip for buyer”. The use of these incentive statements appear in 4.8 % of transactions. The variety among incentives offered have also been categorized into indicator variables such as Closing Costs, Credit for Repairs, HOA Fees, Home Warranty, or Other Incentives taking the value one if the incentives fall in any of these categories and zero otherwise. The Other Incentives indicator variable represents incentives such as vacation trips. The measurement for time on the market (TOM) is taken by differencing the entry date of the property (list date) and date of the status change to pending (contract agreement date). Motivated is a dummy variable taking the value one if there is wording in the Agent’s Comments which says something to the effect of “highly motivated seller”, “reduced-bring all offers”, “seller ready to relocate ”, “foreclosure proceedings initiated ”, or “property priced just below market value ”. These phrases are similar to phrases used in Glower et al. (1998) and Springer (1996) to represent motivated sellers. The Remodeled variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is wording such as “updated ”,
“remade ”, “everything new”, “house just redone” , “roof replaced/redone” or “ house remodeled” in the Agent ’s Comments. Degree of overpricing (DOP) is measured using the procedure described in Jud et al. (1996) by taking the differencebetween the natural logarithm of the list price of the property and the natural logarithm of the predicted price from a hedonic price model. Atypicality is measured using the method described in Haurin (1988) which takes the deviations from selected observable characteristics of each property from characteristics clevels common in the area and then sums all deviations using a hedonic price equation.
中文翻译
如何在房地产低迷时期激励购房者?
肯尼斯·W ·索尼&乔纳森·A ·威利和肯·H ·约翰逊
发表:2012年10月31日纽约2012 # 斯普林格科学+商业媒体
摘 要
我们可以通过在房地产低迷期的多重上市数据得出，激励机制持续地影响着营销市场。其中卖家为潜在购房者提供的直接激励是最重要的。据称，在销售价格软化市场条件下，激励机制并不能被资本化。另外，我们还发现激励可以明显减少营销时间。然而，这种现象只适用于闭合成本，并不是用于其它激励方式。当卖方溢价过高时，通过激励减少市场预期时间的收益会很快减少。 【关键字】激励；经纪公司；住宅；事务；定价过高
介绍
在2010年中期，据《华尔街日报》报道，美国全国房地产市场库存过剩约240万单元（蕙兰在2010年发表) 。住房空置率为2.6%，这近30个基点空置率从1965年一月跟踪统计以来的最高值。据称，这种供给冲击的影响没有减少。原因可能是卖房之间对住房供应过盛的竞争或是限制激进激励的潜在好处和其它买家激励的作用。
在这项研究中，房屋卖方激励的市场影响可以从佛罗里达州的博卡拉顿数据集得出结果。本研究的重点在卖方直接给买方的注重个体数据采集的激励措施。这些研究主要是对激励有效性、对房地产交易价格及持续时间的影响进行分析。数据样本覆盖了从2009年到2011年，分析全国房地产低迷时期市场状况。购房奖励有多种方式：融资费、手续费、信用修正，房屋所有税、家庭担保，还有其它与非融资津贴。房地产预期效果取决于溢价。融资费用包括利率购买起伏，如折扣点，或低于市场融资的形式承担的抵押贷款和卖方融资。潜在的购房者使用债务融资可能愿意支付更高的价格为房地产融资，而房地产融资的费用包括了个人的估值溢价和受增加现金需求约束结算。因为以上原因，融资费预计不会完全资本化为销售价格。如果卖家提供融资溢价作为激励手段不需要更高的价格, 那么融资溢价应该导致减少预期销售时间。所需的价格由卖方可以通过上市价格表示。如果上市的价格与融资溢价的组合大大增加，然后对营销的持续时间的潜在影响是在试图利用融资费为成交价格交易所降低。买家融资溢价的效用在高利率时期有价值。然
而, 削弱了房地产市场状况往往伴随着时间的低利率, 这限制了潜在的融资费用在房地产低迷的有效性。对于本研究中考虑的样本，融资保险费不会出现，而将作为激励提供所有潜在购房。 相比之下, 当卖方提供支付买方关闭一部分成关闭或未完全关闭, 这样它的估值并不依赖于单个买方贴现率。此外, 潜在购房者不使用债务融资，可以通过现金支付的形式在交易结束。而交易费用的好处是立竿见影的，它可以在低迷的市场条件和广泛的基础利率使用的环境下，独立并且吸引着潜在置业者。在正常的市场条件下，充分利用由卖家支付，而买家需要进行收盘资金结算，这个过程制约整个收盘销售额成本价格。当卖方不要求关闭成本完全资本化，将眼前的现金优势提供给所有潜在的购房者，减少预期营销持续时间。在经济低迷时期, 部分卖家价格竞争增加, 通过不切实际的价格来达到试图关闭成本。这样的关闭成本缩短预期的营销时间。由此可以看出，价格在缩短营销时间的过程中，具有很大的竞争性。
提供信用修理往往与延迟维护，和获得一个具有竞争力的销售价格是相互关联的。当维修优惠进行必要的适当调整，对价格的影响应该是零。虽然营销持续时间可能延长，但是它不受到延迟维护。
HOA费（服务费）类似于融资估值溢价, 取决于个别买家, 但是影响预计要小得多，提供的是典型的卖方支付服务费，在很短的时间，例如1或2年，而不是出于对抵押贷款的生活。如果为HOA 费比所在社区里的收费了，那么预期影响和其拥有类似的价格但HOA 费低的社区具有竞争，这个竟争不是卖更高的价格或降低营销的持续时间。
国内担保和其他许多包括个人财产或假期的额外津贴, 可以分为每月的按揭付款和无关所需的现金结算。这些资产通常是非常小的表示为购买价格的百分比, 可以很容易地购买私人市场除了住宅以外的交易, 其对销售价格的影响是有限的。激励不直接放松支付或制约资金结算。在一个给定的上市价格增加置业的兴趣，该资产提供相对较高，同时预计不会显著降低（除提供的资产价值相对较高）营销时间。
在低迷的房地产市场，考虑到激励的在销售时间和销售价格的有效性影响，研制了一种三阶段模型估计影响激励对价格和时间跨度。在第一阶段, 估计卖家的促销手段的决定因素, 包括市场环境。在第二阶段, 交易价格估计, 控制相关基础条件选择的动机。第三阶段，营销的风险模型估计，包括激励措施的潜在影响和持续时间的影响。相互激励之间在探索中定价过高, 和被认为是确定个体的有效性。对卖方激励和溢价之间的相互作用进行了探讨，通过的类别激励机制来确定个体有效性。
本研究的贡献是证明许多传统的激励无法在低端市场被证明是有效的，只收成本的优惠没有任何可靠的冲击，而溢价财产有可能完全取消预期的效益提供激励。一个有力的证据显示激励资本化没有成为最终成交价格；这与艾斯贝尔、尤费和约翰逊得出的结论恰恰相反。他的结论是，当在有利条件下时，卖方把优惠作为最终成交价格，尽管营销持续时间在这些研究中没有被考虑到。费瑞尔和斯尔曼的研究为数不多考虑到激励对营销持续时间影响的研究，虽然他考虑的融资溢价似乎不是由卖方提供的低端市场环境的研究。相反，它被发现缩小成本激励对人有影响，其影响是显著缩短营销在低端市场跨越，而不是去影响交易价格。成本优势的缩小和可能扩大买家都受制于结算现金, 它潜在的好处所有购房者包括那些不使用债务融资, 这某人估值并不取决于个人的折现系数和独立的具有有效地环境。最后, 所有的潜在利益激励是迅速减少，物业挂牌价格超过市场预期的上市价格。定价和激励之间的相互作用还没有被先前的考虑。
研究的其余部分组织如下。下一节提供了研究背景和额外的动力。这是部分数据描述和方法论。最后两个部分讨论结果并提供结论意见。
背景和额外的动机
在竞争非常激烈的市场环境中, 发现大多数卖家, 有三种主要的方式来吸引潜在的购者。首先是房地产价格有竞争性质。第二种方法是激励券商措施。第三, 这仍然是一个相对较新的领域, 为卖家提供激励，直接向购房者有机会。考虑列表价格的考虑，细研究了房地产经济学文献。相关的研究发现, 卖家通常信号通过许多策略包括他们的动机, 以下为物业的市场价值设定初始定价（本杰明和采奴在2000发表）。沿着这些线路，哈瑞尔在(1988年) 提供证据表明，买家往往限制了他们的搜索考虑中的狭义的价格范围和特定的特性。定价过高的程度稀释潜在买家的数量和增加一个漫长的销售期的概率（1996斯普林格）。上市价格太高了也减少了提供的频率(格瑞和威瑞思在1994年) 。销售代理是否减少营销时间的经验证据是复杂的。佐恩和拉森(1986)进行了一项关于固定费用和佣金比例的房地产经纪人的激励效应研究。作者发现佣金比例和激励都不能提升他们寻找潜在客户的热情。在一个相关的研究中, 甘兰和阿诺特(1991)发现未能分配比例的佣金合同执行不佳、不能规避风险和有效地提供激励。他们还指出, 佣金比例会影响代理消耗更少的努力和承担更大的风险。
米尼克和雅牙等人在（2001年），探讨佣金结构差异如何影响不是传统形式的权委托代理公司（即RE/ MAX地产代理商）。在RE/ MAX中，经纪人支付一定的费用给代理机构，并为其提供办公空间，秘书服务，经纪人保持全权委托而不是和传统企业的机制一致进行佣金分裂。他们发现，均衡的销售价格和预期的时间出售上市地产，通过全代理与传统的代理没有不同。另外，
约翰逊等人在2008年发现，在控制自我选择的问题后，当出售时有轻微溢价和显著缩短营销跨越需全额补偿销售经纪人（如RE / MAX经纪人）。另外，约翰逊等人在2004年，发现挂牌代理通过减价或在市场上长时间停留而出售的，销售的经纪人还会提供奖金激励机制。
通过非现金激励的影响，促进经纪人成交速度也被作为调查的主题。杰尼等人（在1991 年) 表明, 在一个有限的时间上市中合同, 经纪人通过努力寻找买家来增加时间。他们注意到，随着合同期内下降，代理人的努力水平提高, 而他们的动机提供完整的市场信息变得较弱。W 威力等人（2010年）所崇尚有着相似的观点，即一个较长的上市合约期清单代理卖房子也会减少代理工作, 减少搜索强度和导致更长的营销时间。然而，笔者注意到，限制卖方带来的成本，由代理人的努力可能无法达到规定的时限内销售。布诺斯顿等人(在2011年) 声称, 如果上市合同期限太长, 经纪人可能不会着力努力直到合同更接近期满。由于这样的事实，经纪人会对于上市期被代理商进行优先级列表。一些研究提供了直接的潜在买家，卖家的激励往往把重点放在专门的折扣点和/或关闭的成本，这样的优惠，资本化为一所房子的销售价格。费雷拉和舒文（在1989年）认为考虑融资费和公告在上市交易的有积极的影响。根据良好的市场价格条件的影响，和持续时间只有当条件是有利的营销不利的卖家。艾黑斯和霍夫曼在（1997年）同时考虑折扣点和关闭成本，将他们进行一个单独的分析和文件。折扣点资本进入的售价，但没有证据表明，交易费用对销售价格的影响。约翰逊等人在（2000年）发现，完全的卖家让步，包括折扣点和关闭成本，是完全合同价格资本化。
在本节中讨论, 很明显发现大部分文献激励往往专注于激励销售经纪人，但发现这种激励没有达到共识的影响。然而, 最后的决定是由买方购买房产。卖家直接向买家提供的激励措施有可能为激励提供更有效和直接的联系。大部分研究都集中在这个联系下，目前市场已经失去了在当前的低利率的优势，由卖方主要提供融资保险费的证据。这项目前的研究有助于我们理解现代激励机制的有效性，包括在低迷的市场条件下，当先前的评估激励机制（即，融资费）中不可能的工作。此外，本研究引入了分析定价过高和激励先前未考虑的有效性之间的相互作用。 数据和方法
数据
数据来自于多重上市服务(MLS)在佛罗里达州博卡拉顿, 包括2689个总观测，和2009年11月15日到2011年11月15日观察收集的销售数据。数据包含特征信息、位置和其他卖家属性包括, 但不限于, 房地产是否止赎、空置或卖方“动机”。表1给出了变量描述和表2总结统计。从
样品中我们发现，平均交易价格为414689美元；平均挂牌价格为459055美元；与市场上的来自合同日期列表平均天数是129。房地产包含平均2443个加热平方英尺和63%的性能有一个游泳池。 激励是兴趣的变量，这是一个指示符变量的值中如果包含代理的评论短语，可以将短语进行网络搜索，然后卖方通过引用MLS 直接向潜在买家提供激励。激励等的措辞例子包括语句如“卖方支付关闭成本”、“卖方将为维修提供信贷”、“协会费用由卖方支付”、“卖方提供房屋保修援助”或“买方的度假之旅”。这些激励的语句的使用会出现在4.8%的交易。激励措施提供了多种选择，也被分为指标变量比如交易费，信用维修，服务费，上门保修或其他激励才采取的价值之一，如果激励没有落在任何一类则为0。该其他激励指标变量代表激励措施，比如度假旅行。 市场上的测量时间(名单日期) 是由有差别的入境日期(上市日期) 和状态更改的日期(合同约定日期) 组成。动机是一个虚拟变量，它的价值在代理人的评论中表示“高度的影响卖家”，“所有的提供减少”，“卖方准备搬迁”，“止赎程序启动的”或“房地产价格低于市场价值”。这些短语相似短语被葛楼尔在(1998年) 和施普林格在(1996年) 都来表示动机卖家。改制的变量是一个指示符变量的价值，如果有“更新”等措辞，“重塑”、“新”、“房子刚刚重做”、“屋顶取代/重做”或“房子改造”代理的评论。
季节性变量指示一年的时间上市。费雷尔在（1996年）和克鲁格和米勒在（1990年）研究发现，季节性影响着市场持续时间。过度高估程度(DOP)是衡量使用应用程序来判断朱迪等人在(1996年) 通过以资产的上市价格的自然对数与价格模型的预测价格的特征自然对数之间的差异比较。在MLS 的报告中汇总统计数据使用的样本，包括2689个来自佛罗里达州波卡拉顿的交易。表1中定义的所有变量。表报告样本均值(平均) ，标准偏差(标准差) ，最小之和最大值。为每个变量被认为是在这项研究中使用河里尼在（1988年）中描述的方法，将每个属性的偏离选定的可观察到的特点共同水平特征的区域, 然后总结所有使用何尼克采用的价格偏差方程。
参考文献
【1】Anglin, P. M., & Arnott, R. (1991). Residential real estate brokerage as a principal-agent problem. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,4,99–125.
Anglin, P. M., Rutherford, R. C., & Springer, T. M. (2003). The trade-off between selling price of residential properties and time-on-the-market: the impact of price setting. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 26, 95–111.
【2】Asabere, P. K., & Huffman, F. E. (1997). Discount point concessions and the value of home withconventional versus nonconventionalmortgage financing. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,
19, 261–270.
【3】Benefield, J. D., Cain, C. L., & Johnson, K. H. (2011). On the relationship between property price, time-onmarket,
and photo depictions in a multiple listing service. Journal of Real Estate Finance andEconomics, 43, 401–422.
【4】Benefield, J.D., Rutherford, R.C., Allen, M.T. (2011b). The effects of estate sales of residential real estate
on price and marketing time. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, forthcoming.
【5】Benjamin, J. D., & Chinloy, P. (2000). Pricing, exposure and residential listing strategies. Journal of Real，Estate Research, 20, 61–74.
【6】Brastow, R.T., Springer, T.M., Waller, B.D. (2011). Efficiency and incentives in residential brokerage.Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, forthcoming.
【7】Elder, H. W., Zumpano, L. V., & Baryla, E. A. (2000). Buyer brokers: do they make a difference? Theirinfluence on selling price and search duration. Real Estate Economics, 28, 337–362.
【8】Ferreira, E. J., & Sirmans, G. S. (1989). Selling price, financing premiums and days on the market. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2, 209–222.
Forgey, F. A., Rutherford, R. C., & Springer, T. M. (1996). Search and liquidity in single family housing.Real Estate Economics, 24, 273–292.
【9】Geltner, D., Kluger, B. D., & Miller, N. G. (1991). Optimal price and selling effort from the perspectives of the broker and seller. Real Estate Economics, 19, 1–24.
【10】Glower, M., Haurin, D. R., & Hendershott, P. H. (1998). Selling time and selling price: the influence of seller motivation. Real Estate Economics, 26, 719–740.
英 文 翻 译
姓 名：王婵娟
学 号：1102090218
指导教师：白芙蓉
专 业：工程管理
班 级：1102班
时 间：2015年4月25日
工 程 管 理 系
工程管理系
英文翻译评价表
注：此表与翻译文本一起装订
英文原文
Title ：Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn? Kenneth W. Soyeh & Jonathan A. Wiley & Ken H. Johnson
Published online: 31 October 2012
# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012
Abstract
The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn.The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The benefit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount.
【Key words】Incentives; Brokerage; Residential;Transactions ;Overpricing
Introduction
In mid-2010, the Wall Street Journal reported a nationwide inventory excess in the U.S. housing markets of approximately 2.4 million units (Whelan 2010). The home ownership vacancy rate at the same point in time was 2.6 % for the nation. This was within 30 basis points of the highest level of vacancy since tracking this statistic began in 1956.1 There is no evidence that the effects of this recent supply shock have lessened in scale since then. Is it possible that this scale of excess supply of housing units intensifies competition among sellers and limits the potential benefits from aggressive pricing strategies and other buyer incentives?
The purpose of this study is to directly investigate this question. A better understanding of the efficacy of buyer incentives should help significantly as the nation’s excess housing inventory is cleared from the market. More specifically in this study, the impact of home seller incentives on marketing outcomes is examined using a sample of transactions from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) dataset
in Boca Raton, Florida. The focus in this study is on the use of incentives offered by sellers directly to homebuyers, which are individually identified in the data collection. The primary interest is on the effectiveness of incentives and their ability to impact both property transaction price and property duration span. The sample period covers 2009 through 2011, which coincides with depressed real estate conditions in the subject market and is similar to market conditions around the country at the same time. Incentives for homebuyers come in a number of forms, including financing premiums,closing costs, credits for repairs, homeowner association (HOA) fees, home warranties, and others that include perks which are unrelated to the financing. The expected impact depends on which premium is proposed.
Financing premiums include interest rate buy-downs, such as discount points, or below-market financing in the form of assumable mortgages and seller financing. Potential homebuyers who use debt financing may be willing to pay a higher price for a property with financing premiums included, up to the amount of their individual valuation for that premium and subject to constraints of increased cash requirements for settlement at a higher price. An individual valuation of the financing premium will be less than the cost to the seller when the buyer has a household cost of capital that is greater than the interest cost on the mortgage debt or when the individual does not expect to hold the property for the duration of the mortgage term; both of which are likely to be the case given that mortgage debt is typically the lowest cost source of capital for a household and the expected holding period is often less than the term of the standard mortgage instrument. For these reasons, financing premiums are not expected to be fully capitalized into the selling price. If a seller offering financing premiums as incentives does not require a higher price, then the financing premium should result in a reduction in the expected marketing duration. The required price by the seller can be signaled through the listing price. If the listing price is increased substantially in combination with the financing premium, then the potential impact to the marketing duration is reduced in exchange for an attempt to capitalize the financing premium into the transaction price. The utility of the financing premium for buyers can be valuable during periods of high interest rates. However, weakened real estate market conditions tend to coincide with periods of low interest rates, which limits the potential effectiveness of financing premiums during real estate downturns. For the sample considered in this study, financing premiums do not appear to be offered at all as incentives for potential homebuyers.
By comparison, when a seller offers to pay some portion of the buyer’s closing costs, that amount is delivered at closing and undiscounted so that its valuation does not rely on an individual buyer ’s
discount rate. In addition, prospective homebuyers who do not use debt financing in the home purchase can benefit from the cash payment at closing. The benefit from closing costs is immediate and independent of the interest rate environment with appeal to a broader base of potential homebuyers, providing this concession with distinct advantages during weakened market conditions. During healthy market conditions, there is the potential to fully capitalize closing costs paid by the seller into the selling price when there are buyers who are constrained by the settlement cash required for closing. When the seller does not require that the closing costs are fully capitalized, the immediate cash advantage is available to all potential homebuyers and expected to reduce the marketing duration.During a downturn, there is increased price competition among sellers and it can be more difficult or impractical to price aggressively in an attempt to capitalize closing cost concessions —in which case the expected impact shifts to shorten the marketing duration for properties that are priced competitively.
Credits offered for repairs are often associated with deferred maintenance properties and those repairs may be necessary to obtain a competitive selling price. When the repair credits are appropriate to the necessary adjustment, the impact on price should be zero although marketing duration may be extended relative to properties that do not suffer from deferred maintenance.
HOA fees are similar to financing premiums in the sense that the valuation depends on the individual buyer, however the impact is expected to be much smaller since the offer is typically for the seller to pay HOA fees over a very short term, for example 1 or 2 years rather than for the life of the mortgage loan. If contributions toward HOA fees are offered in communities where fees are relatively high, then the expected impact is to achieve a similar price relative to competitive properties in communities where HOA fees are lower, rather than to sell at a higher price or reduce marketing durations.
Home warranties and many other perquisites, including personal property or vacations, can be classified as unrelated to the monthly mortgage payment and the cash required for settlement. These assets are often quite small when expressed as a percentage of the purchase price and can easily be purchased in the private market apart from the residential transaction, so the impact on selling price is limited. Incentives that do not directly relax the payment or settlement cash constraints have limited potential to increase the pool of interested home buyers at a given listing price and would not be expected to significantly reduce marketing duration unless the value of the asset offered is relatively high.
To consider the effectiveness of incentives in a depressed real estate market for the impact on both marketing duration and selling price, a three-stage model is developed to estimate the impact of incentives on price and duration span. In the first stage, the estimation is for the determinants of incentives being offered by sellers, including market conditions. In the second stage, the transaction price is estimated and the impact from the use of incentives is isolated, controlling underlying conditions relating to incentive selection. The third stage estimates the hazard model for marketing duration effects, if any, including the potential impact from incentives. The interaction between incentives and overpricing by sellers is also explored, and incentives are considered in separate categories to identify individual effectiveness.
The contributions of this study are to document that many conventional incentives fail to prove effective during a downmarket, that only closing cost concessions have any reliable impact, and that overpricing a property has the potential to entirely cancel the expected benefit from offering incentives.
A preponderance of the evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the final transaction price; this is in contrast to the findings of Asabere and Huffman (1997) and Johnson et al. (2000) who conclude that seller paid concessions capitalize into the final transaction price when considering outcomes under favorable market conditions, although marketing mduration was not considered in those studies. Ferreira and Sirmans (1989) appears to be the only other study to consider the impact of incentives on marketing duration, although the consideration is for financing premiums which does not appear to be offered by sellers in the low interest rate environment considered in our study. Instead, it is closing cost incentives alone that are found to have an impact and their impact is to significantly shorten marketing spans during a downmarket, rather to affect the transaction price. The advantage to closing cost concessions is that it is a lump-sumat closing potentially expanding to the pool of buyers who are constrained by settlement cash, it potentially benefits all homebuyers including those who do not use debt financing, its valuation does not depend on an individual’s discount factor and the effectiveness is independent of the interest rate environment. Finally, the potential benefit from all incentives is quickly diminished as property listing price exceeds market expected listed price. The interaction between overpricing and incentives has not been previously considered.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section provides background and additional motivation for the study. This is followed with a section on data description and methodology. The last two sections discuss the results and provide concluding comments.
Background and Additional Motivation
In the very competitive market setting in which most sellers find themselves presently, there are three primary ways of attracting potential homebuyers. The first is to price the property competitively. The second method is to offer incentives to brokers. And the third, which remains a relatively unexplored area, is the opportunity for sellers to offer incentives directly to homebuyers. Consideration for the relevance of list price has been examined at length in the real estate economics literature. Related studies find that sellers often signal their motivation through many strategies including, but not limited to, setting the initial list price at or below market value for the property (Benjamin and Chinloy 2000). Along these lines, Haurin (1988) provides evidence that buyers often constrain their search to consider only properties within a narrowly-defined price range and for specific characteristics. The degree of overpricing thins out the volume of traffic from potential buyers and increases the probability of a lengthy marketing period (Springer 1996). A listing price that is too high also reduces the frequency of offers for a property (Green and Vandell 1994). The empirical evidence on whether selling broker incentives reduce marketing duration is mixed. Zorn and Larsen (1986) conducted a study on the incentive effects of flat-fee and percentage commissions for real estate brokers. The authors find that neither a percentage commission nor a flat-flee motivates a broker to increase his or her level of search for a potential buyer. In a related study, Anglin and Arnott (1991) find that the percentage commission contract performs poorly by failing to allocate risk and to provide broker incentives efficiently. They note further that a percentage commission influences a broker to expend less effort and bear greater risk. Munneke and Yavas (2001), among others, investigate how the difference in commission structures affects the performance of agents at full-commission firms (i.e., RE/MAX real estate agents) against those in traditional firms. At RE/MAX, brokers pay a fixed fee to the agency for office space, secretarial services and keep the full commission as opposed to splitting the commission with the agency in traditionalm firms. They find that the equilibrium selling price and the expected time it takes to sell a listed property through a full-commission agent and a traditional agent do not differ. Alternatively, Johnson et al. (2008) find that after controlling for self-selection issues properties marketed by full-compensation brokers (i.e. RE/MAX like brokers) sell at a slight premium and in significantly shorter marketing spans. Alternatively, Johnson et al. (2004) find that properties marketed by listing brokers sold at a reduced price and stayed longer on market when the selling brokers were offered
bonus incentives.
The influence of non-cash incentives for brokers to close a deal faster has also been the subject of investigation. Geltner et al. (1991) show that under a finiteduration listing contract, the broker’s search efforts to find a buyer will increase over time. They note that as the contract term declines, the agent’s effort level improves while their incentive to provide complete market information becomes weaker.Waller et al. (2010) share a similar view by advocating that a longer listing contract period given to the listing broker to sell a house will diminish broker effort, reduce search intensity and lead to a longer marketing time. A study by Miceli (1989), on the effects of listing contract length, finds that a limit on the duration of the listing contract can be effective in increasing broker effort. However, the author notes that the limitation brings with it a cost to the seller since the best efforts of the agent might not achieve a sale within the speculated time frame. Brastow et al. (2011) assert that if the listing contract term is too long, the broker may not exert effort until the contract is closer to expiration due to the fact that other contract listings that are about to expire soon might be put on the priority list of the broker.
The few studies that examine incentives offered to potential purchasers directly from sellers tend to focus exclusively on discount points and/or closing costs and how such concessions are capitalized into the selling price of a house. Ferreira and Sirmans (1989) consider financing premiums only and find that their announcement in the listing has a positive impact on the transaction price under favorable market conditions, and impacts only the marketing duration when conditions are not favorable to sellers. Asabere and Huffman (1997) consider both discount points and closing costs in a separate analysis and document that discounts points are capitalized into the selling price, but find no evidence that closing costs have an impact on the selling prices. Johnson et al. (2000) find that the total seller concessions, including both discount points and closing costs together, are entirely capitalized into the contract price. From the discussion in this section, it is apparent that much of literature on incentives has tended to concentrate on incentives to selling brokers with little consensus on their impact. However, the final decision to purchase a property is 38to establish a more direct linkage for the effectiveness of incentives. For the few studies that have focused on this connection, the evidence is for primarily financing premiums offered by sellers, which have lost favor in the present low interest rate environment. The research reported in the present study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of modern incentives when they are most needed, including during depressed market conditions and when
previously evaluated incentives (i.e., financing premiums) are unlikely to work. In addition, this study introduces analysis for the interaction between overpricing and the effectiveness of incentives which previously has not been considered.
Data and Methodology
Data
The data comes from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) in Boca Raton, FL and includes a total of 2,689 observations of sold properties collected from November 15, 2009 through November 15, 2011. The data contains information on property characteristics, location and other seller attributes including, but not limited to, whether the property is a foreclosure, vacant, or the seller is “motivated ”. Table 1 presents variable descriptions and Table 2 presents summary statistics. From the sample, the mean transaction price is $414,689; the mean listing price is $459,055; and the average number of days on the market is 129 from list date to contract date. The average property contains 2,443 heated square feet and 63 % of the properties have a pool.
The variable of interest is Incentives, which is an indicator variable taking a value of one if there are phrases in the agent ’s comments viewable to internet searchers of the MLS referencing seller incentives being offered directly to potential buyers. Examples for the wording of such incentives include statements such as “seller pays closing cost”, “seller will offer credit for repairs”, “Association Fees to be paid by seller”, “seller offers home warranty assistance”, or “vacation trip for buyer”. The use of these incentive statements appear in 4.8 % of transactions. The variety among incentives offered have also been categorized into indicator variables such as Closing Costs, Credit for Repairs, HOA Fees, Home Warranty, or Other Incentives taking the value one if the incentives fall in any of these categories and zero otherwise. The Other Incentives indicator variable represents incentives such as vacation trips. The measurement for time on the market (TOM) is taken by differencing the entry date of the property (list date) and date of the status change to pending (contract agreement date). Motivated is a dummy variable taking the value one if there is wording in the Agent’s Comments which says something to the effect of “highly motivated seller”, “reduced-bring all offers”, “seller ready to relocate ”, “foreclosure proceedings initiated ”, or “property priced just below market value ”. These phrases are similar to phrases used in Glower et al. (1998) and Springer (1996) to represent motivated sellers. The Remodeled variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is wording such as “updated ”,
“remade ”, “everything new”, “house just redone” , “roof replaced/redone” or “ house remodeled” in the Agent ’s Comments. Degree of overpricing (DOP) is measured using the procedure described in Jud et al. (1996) by taking the differencebetween the natural logarithm of the list price of the property and the natural logarithm of the predicted price from a hedonic price model. Atypicality is measured using the method described in Haurin (1988) which takes the deviations from selected observable characteristics of each property from characteristics clevels common in the area and then sums all deviations using a hedonic price equation.
中文翻译
如何在房地产低迷时期激励购房者?
肯尼斯·W ·索尼&乔纳森·A ·威利和肯·H ·约翰逊
发表:2012年10月31日纽约2012 # 斯普林格科学+商业媒体
摘 要
我们可以通过在房地产低迷期的多重上市数据得出，激励机制持续地影响着营销市场。其中卖家为潜在购房者提供的直接激励是最重要的。据称，在销售价格软化市场条件下，激励机制并不能被资本化。另外，我们还发现激励可以明显减少营销时间。然而，这种现象只适用于闭合成本，并不是用于其它激励方式。当卖方溢价过高时，通过激励减少市场预期时间的收益会很快减少。 【关键字】激励；经纪公司；住宅；事务；定价过高
介绍
在2010年中期，据《华尔街日报》报道，美国全国房地产市场库存过剩约240万单元（蕙兰在2010年发表) 。住房空置率为2.6%，这近30个基点空置率从1965年一月跟踪统计以来的最高值。据称，这种供给冲击的影响没有减少。原因可能是卖房之间对住房供应过盛的竞争或是限制激进激励的潜在好处和其它买家激励的作用。
在这项研究中，房屋卖方激励的市场影响可以从佛罗里达州的博卡拉顿数据集得出结果。本研究的重点在卖方直接给买方的注重个体数据采集的激励措施。这些研究主要是对激励有效性、对房地产交易价格及持续时间的影响进行分析。数据样本覆盖了从2009年到2011年，分析全国房地产低迷时期市场状况。购房奖励有多种方式：融资费、手续费、信用修正，房屋所有税、家庭担保，还有其它与非融资津贴。房地产预期效果取决于溢价。融资费用包括利率购买起伏，如折扣点，或低于市场融资的形式承担的抵押贷款和卖方融资。潜在的购房者使用债务融资可能愿意支付更高的价格为房地产融资，而房地产融资的费用包括了个人的估值溢价和受增加现金需求约束结算。因为以上原因，融资费预计不会完全资本化为销售价格。如果卖家提供融资溢价作为激励手段不需要更高的价格, 那么融资溢价应该导致减少预期销售时间。所需的价格由卖方可以通过上市价格表示。如果上市的价格与融资溢价的组合大大增加，然后对营销的持续时间的潜在影响是在试图利用融资费为成交价格交易所降低。买家融资溢价的效用在高利率时期有价值。然
而, 削弱了房地产市场状况往往伴随着时间的低利率, 这限制了潜在的融资费用在房地产低迷的有效性。对于本研究中考虑的样本，融资保险费不会出现，而将作为激励提供所有潜在购房。 相比之下, 当卖方提供支付买方关闭一部分成关闭或未完全关闭, 这样它的估值并不依赖于单个买方贴现率。此外, 潜在购房者不使用债务融资，可以通过现金支付的形式在交易结束。而交易费用的好处是立竿见影的，它可以在低迷的市场条件和广泛的基础利率使用的环境下，独立并且吸引着潜在置业者。在正常的市场条件下，充分利用由卖家支付，而买家需要进行收盘资金结算，这个过程制约整个收盘销售额成本价格。当卖方不要求关闭成本完全资本化，将眼前的现金优势提供给所有潜在的购房者，减少预期营销持续时间。在经济低迷时期, 部分卖家价格竞争增加, 通过不切实际的价格来达到试图关闭成本。这样的关闭成本缩短预期的营销时间。由此可以看出，价格在缩短营销时间的过程中，具有很大的竞争性。
提供信用修理往往与延迟维护，和获得一个具有竞争力的销售价格是相互关联的。当维修优惠进行必要的适当调整，对价格的影响应该是零。虽然营销持续时间可能延长，但是它不受到延迟维护。
HOA费（服务费）类似于融资估值溢价, 取决于个别买家, 但是影响预计要小得多，提供的是典型的卖方支付服务费，在很短的时间，例如1或2年，而不是出于对抵押贷款的生活。如果为HOA 费比所在社区里的收费了，那么预期影响和其拥有类似的价格但HOA 费低的社区具有竞争，这个竟争不是卖更高的价格或降低营销的持续时间。
国内担保和其他许多包括个人财产或假期的额外津贴, 可以分为每月的按揭付款和无关所需的现金结算。这些资产通常是非常小的表示为购买价格的百分比, 可以很容易地购买私人市场除了住宅以外的交易, 其对销售价格的影响是有限的。激励不直接放松支付或制约资金结算。在一个给定的上市价格增加置业的兴趣，该资产提供相对较高，同时预计不会显著降低（除提供的资产价值相对较高）营销时间。
在低迷的房地产市场，考虑到激励的在销售时间和销售价格的有效性影响，研制了一种三阶段模型估计影响激励对价格和时间跨度。在第一阶段, 估计卖家的促销手段的决定因素, 包括市场环境。在第二阶段, 交易价格估计, 控制相关基础条件选择的动机。第三阶段，营销的风险模型估计，包括激励措施的潜在影响和持续时间的影响。相互激励之间在探索中定价过高, 和被认为是确定个体的有效性。对卖方激励和溢价之间的相互作用进行了探讨，通过的类别激励机制来确定个体有效性。
本研究的贡献是证明许多传统的激励无法在低端市场被证明是有效的，只收成本的优惠没有任何可靠的冲击，而溢价财产有可能完全取消预期的效益提供激励。一个有力的证据显示激励资本化没有成为最终成交价格；这与艾斯贝尔、尤费和约翰逊得出的结论恰恰相反。他的结论是，当在有利条件下时，卖方把优惠作为最终成交价格，尽管营销持续时间在这些研究中没有被考虑到。费瑞尔和斯尔曼的研究为数不多考虑到激励对营销持续时间影响的研究，虽然他考虑的融资溢价似乎不是由卖方提供的低端市场环境的研究。相反，它被发现缩小成本激励对人有影响，其影响是显著缩短营销在低端市场跨越，而不是去影响交易价格。成本优势的缩小和可能扩大买家都受制于结算现金, 它潜在的好处所有购房者包括那些不使用债务融资, 这某人估值并不取决于个人的折现系数和独立的具有有效地环境。最后, 所有的潜在利益激励是迅速减少，物业挂牌价格超过市场预期的上市价格。定价和激励之间的相互作用还没有被先前的考虑。
研究的其余部分组织如下。下一节提供了研究背景和额外的动力。这是部分数据描述和方法论。最后两个部分讨论结果并提供结论意见。
背景和额外的动机
在竞争非常激烈的市场环境中, 发现大多数卖家, 有三种主要的方式来吸引潜在的购者。首先是房地产价格有竞争性质。第二种方法是激励券商措施。第三, 这仍然是一个相对较新的领域, 为卖家提供激励，直接向购房者有机会。考虑列表价格的考虑，细研究了房地产经济学文献。相关的研究发现, 卖家通常信号通过许多策略包括他们的动机, 以下为物业的市场价值设定初始定价（本杰明和采奴在2000发表）。沿着这些线路，哈瑞尔在(1988年) 提供证据表明，买家往往限制了他们的搜索考虑中的狭义的价格范围和特定的特性。定价过高的程度稀释潜在买家的数量和增加一个漫长的销售期的概率（1996斯普林格）。上市价格太高了也减少了提供的频率(格瑞和威瑞思在1994年) 。销售代理是否减少营销时间的经验证据是复杂的。佐恩和拉森(1986)进行了一项关于固定费用和佣金比例的房地产经纪人的激励效应研究。作者发现佣金比例和激励都不能提升他们寻找潜在客户的热情。在一个相关的研究中, 甘兰和阿诺特(1991)发现未能分配比例的佣金合同执行不佳、不能规避风险和有效地提供激励。他们还指出, 佣金比例会影响代理消耗更少的努力和承担更大的风险。
米尼克和雅牙等人在（2001年），探讨佣金结构差异如何影响不是传统形式的权委托代理公司（即RE/ MAX地产代理商）。在RE/ MAX中，经纪人支付一定的费用给代理机构，并为其提供办公空间，秘书服务，经纪人保持全权委托而不是和传统企业的机制一致进行佣金分裂。他们发现，均衡的销售价格和预期的时间出售上市地产，通过全代理与传统的代理没有不同。另外，
约翰逊等人在2008年发现，在控制自我选择的问题后，当出售时有轻微溢价和显著缩短营销跨越需全额补偿销售经纪人（如RE / MAX经纪人）。另外，约翰逊等人在2004年，发现挂牌代理通过减价或在市场上长时间停留而出售的，销售的经纪人还会提供奖金激励机制。
通过非现金激励的影响，促进经纪人成交速度也被作为调查的主题。杰尼等人（在1991 年) 表明, 在一个有限的时间上市中合同, 经纪人通过努力寻找买家来增加时间。他们注意到，随着合同期内下降，代理人的努力水平提高, 而他们的动机提供完整的市场信息变得较弱。W 威力等人（2010年）所崇尚有着相似的观点，即一个较长的上市合约期清单代理卖房子也会减少代理工作, 减少搜索强度和导致更长的营销时间。然而，笔者注意到，限制卖方带来的成本，由代理人的努力可能无法达到规定的时限内销售。布诺斯顿等人(在2011年) 声称, 如果上市合同期限太长, 经纪人可能不会着力努力直到合同更接近期满。由于这样的事实，经纪人会对于上市期被代理商进行优先级列表。一些研究提供了直接的潜在买家，卖家的激励往往把重点放在专门的折扣点和/或关闭的成本，这样的优惠，资本化为一所房子的销售价格。费雷拉和舒文（在1989年）认为考虑融资费和公告在上市交易的有积极的影响。根据良好的市场价格条件的影响，和持续时间只有当条件是有利的营销不利的卖家。艾黑斯和霍夫曼在（1997年）同时考虑折扣点和关闭成本，将他们进行一个单独的分析和文件。折扣点资本进入的售价，但没有证据表明，交易费用对销售价格的影响。约翰逊等人在（2000年）发现，完全的卖家让步，包括折扣点和关闭成本，是完全合同价格资本化。
在本节中讨论, 很明显发现大部分文献激励往往专注于激励销售经纪人，但发现这种激励没有达到共识的影响。然而, 最后的决定是由买方购买房产。卖家直接向买家提供的激励措施有可能为激励提供更有效和直接的联系。大部分研究都集中在这个联系下，目前市场已经失去了在当前的低利率的优势，由卖方主要提供融资保险费的证据。这项目前的研究有助于我们理解现代激励机制的有效性，包括在低迷的市场条件下，当先前的评估激励机制（即，融资费）中不可能的工作。此外，本研究引入了分析定价过高和激励先前未考虑的有效性之间的相互作用。 数据和方法
数据
数据来自于多重上市服务(MLS)在佛罗里达州博卡拉顿, 包括2689个总观测，和2009年11月15日到2011年11月15日观察收集的销售数据。数据包含特征信息、位置和其他卖家属性包括, 但不限于, 房地产是否止赎、空置或卖方“动机”。表1给出了变量描述和表2总结统计。从
样品中我们发现，平均交易价格为414689美元；平均挂牌价格为459055美元；与市场上的来自合同日期列表平均天数是129。房地产包含平均2443个加热平方英尺和63%的性能有一个游泳池。 激励是兴趣的变量，这是一个指示符变量的值中如果包含代理的评论短语，可以将短语进行网络搜索，然后卖方通过引用MLS 直接向潜在买家提供激励。激励等的措辞例子包括语句如“卖方支付关闭成本”、“卖方将为维修提供信贷”、“协会费用由卖方支付”、“卖方提供房屋保修援助”或“买方的度假之旅”。这些激励的语句的使用会出现在4.8%的交易。激励措施提供了多种选择，也被分为指标变量比如交易费，信用维修，服务费，上门保修或其他激励才采取的价值之一，如果激励没有落在任何一类则为0。该其他激励指标变量代表激励措施，比如度假旅行。 市场上的测量时间(名单日期) 是由有差别的入境日期(上市日期) 和状态更改的日期(合同约定日期) 组成。动机是一个虚拟变量，它的价值在代理人的评论中表示“高度的影响卖家”，“所有的提供减少”，“卖方准备搬迁”，“止赎程序启动的”或“房地产价格低于市场价值”。这些短语相似短语被葛楼尔在(1998年) 和施普林格在(1996年) 都来表示动机卖家。改制的变量是一个指示符变量的价值，如果有“更新”等措辞，“重塑”、“新”、“房子刚刚重做”、“屋顶取代/重做”或“房子改造”代理的评论。
季节性变量指示一年的时间上市。费雷尔在（1996年）和克鲁格和米勒在（1990年）研究发现，季节性影响着市场持续时间。过度高估程度(DOP)是衡量使用应用程序来判断朱迪等人在(1996年) 通过以资产的上市价格的自然对数与价格模型的预测价格的特征自然对数之间的差异比较。在MLS 的报告中汇总统计数据使用的样本，包括2689个来自佛罗里达州波卡拉顿的交易。表1中定义的所有变量。表报告样本均值(平均) ，标准偏差(标准差) ，最小之和最大值。为每个变量被认为是在这项研究中使用河里尼在（1988年）中描述的方法，将每个属性的偏离选定的可观察到的特点共同水平特征的区域, 然后总结所有使用何尼克采用的价格偏差方程。
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