如何法律思维?
——德沃金与波斯纳之争
吴 越
大凡国内的法律人已经知道了德沃金与波斯纳的PK; 两个NR你来我往无数回合,最终谁也没有说服谁,谁也没有打倒谁。不仅如此,尽管在二人在PK的过程中都有受伤,并且在PK过程中都暗自承认了对方观点的一些合理性,换言之,二人在PK的过程中越来越强壮,这符合苏格拉底式教学法的规律:不但真理愈辩愈明,辩论人也实现了教学相长。
在德沃金与波斯纳的较量中,鄙人认为最具有代表性的一次PK发生在1997年。这次争论在现在看来不但丝毫没有过时,而且现实似乎仍然在朝着中了二人之各自预言的方向发展。
本来,法学名流观点相左也不是什么新鲜事,背地里甚至贬低一下对方,骂一下人也不会有什么后果,但是德沃金非常NB,他终于忍不住公开骂人了(当然,波斯纳也不是好惹的,他损起人来,比德沃金还厉害)。1997年,应美国
因此,本文主要介绍一下二人讲座的主要内容,其依据也是上述两篇论文。
一、德沃金对波斯纳和桑斯坦的批判
首先来看德沃金的观点。按德沃金的说法,是波斯纳先招惹德沃金。众所周知,德沃金十分看重
第一个例子:避孕药的副作用。某美国妇女长期服用(各种)避孕药,后来身体受到伤害。但是她不知道或者不能证明究竟是哪个厂家生产的避孕药导致了她的伤害。争论的焦点是:美国的众多避孕药生产商是否应当对此伤害承担连带的损害赔偿责任?对此有两种对立的观点。第一种观点认为,由于本案中因果关系不明确,因此生产商将不可能承担任何责任,例如一些法院和美国最高法院均持这种观点。第二种观点则认为,尽管不能证明是哪家厂商的避孕药导致该妇女受到伤害,但是倘若她得不到赔偿,这将是一个宪法问题。
第二个例子:辅助性自杀(assisted suicide)。所谓辅助性自杀,也即在医生帮助下的
第三个例子:焚烧国旗。第一种观点认为,焚烧国旗是不道义的,并且是违宪的。第二种观点则认为,焚烧国旗其实是个人的表达自由的体现,因此是合法的。
第四个例子:堕胎。第一种观点认为,堕胎是合法的。第二种观点则认为,堕胎是违法的。
德沃金试图通过上述案件说明他的
紧接着,德沃金还通过希腊神话中的
[4]
总之,德沃金的论调是,法官在进行法律思维的时候,必须像海格力斯大力神那样,事先在心中装着各种理论与各种价值,通过理论和价值衡量来裁决具体纠纷。
然而,波斯纳在其1995年出版的著作
针对波斯纳的批评,德沃金回敬道,
德沃金进一步指出,波斯纳还
于是,德沃金要向波斯纳和桑斯坦发起反击,这也是为何德沃金专门找芝加哥学派算帐的根本原因。德沃金在讲座中批评波斯纳和桑斯坦犯了三大错误。他这样说道:
第一:形而上学(Metaphysics)。德沃金认为,政治伦理属于客观真理,例如存在着对种族屠杀、种族歧视和言论自由的普适性的伦理观念。反之,波斯纳则认为,并不存在所谓普适性的客观真理,也即不存在普适性的政治伦理。为此,德沃金是这样反驳的:
第二,实用主义(Pragmatics)。德沃金认为,波斯纳说他对法官裁判的评价理论并不依赖于哲学命题,而是独自成立的(free-standing)。为此,德沃金引用了波斯纳的一段话:
波斯纳强调法律思维的前瞻性(forward-looking)。对此,德沃金反驳说,前瞻式的法律思维本来就有两种含义。含义之一是法律思维是结果导向的,而不是道义伦理式的(deontological)[9]。含义之二是指福利主义者(welfarist),而不是结果导向的。倘若波斯纳注意到二者之间的区分的话,就应当意识到他自己误解了德沃金所主张的法律思维的理论根基观。因为在德沃金看来,主张法律思维的理论根基并不必然就是反功利主义的。而波斯纳的
内燃机的物理结构,试试各种办法看看其中一个是否灵验。
第三,职业主义(Professionalism)。所谓职业主义,是指一种倾向,按照这种倾向,法官或律师在思考问题时总是进行职业化的(或者说专业化的思维),这种思维拒绝理论,尤其是哲学理论。为此,德沃金以常人的口气形容道:
反之,德沃金则反驳说,其实桑斯坦这个人是自相矛盾的。因为桑斯坦自己也承认,
德沃金最后总结道:
二、波斯纳对德沃金反驳的反驳
针对德沃金的反驳,波斯纳也毫不示弱,对德沃金的观点进行了攻击。
首先,波斯纳指出,所谓
如
在此基础上,波斯纳认为,德沃金的所谓
波斯纳进一步指出,
(induction) 不可混淆。法官到达正义的顶点之后,他就将(理论的)梯子踢开了。由于被强迫爬上(正义的)梯子,法官承认,如果不采纳大原则他就无法判案,但是一旦采纳,他就判案了。
在厘清了德沃金理论的来龙去脉之后,波斯纳接着对德沃金对他的批判进行了反驳。
首先,波斯纳指出,
其次,波斯纳指出,德沃金的
第三,波斯纳指出,大多数的道德真理与科学真理不同,都是所谓
至于德沃金批评的
在最后,波斯纳承认,德沃金的法律思维观其实是从事法律工作的一种方式而已,也即不排除波斯纳自己的那种思维方式的存在。但德沃金的思维方式显然不是最佳途径。它对于判例法国家而言显然是太抽象了。它或许在
从以上的论战不难看出,尽管德沃金与波斯纳的争论,有相当一部分属于情绪化的争论,但是二人对于法律思维的路径之争却是有着非常重要的现实意义的。
注释:
[1] A claim of law-either that the drug victim wins or loses or that flag burning can or cannot constitutionally be prohibited-is tantamount to the claim, then, that one principle or another provides a better justification of some part of legal practice. Better in what way? Better interpretively- better, that is, because it fits the legal practice better, and puts it in a better light. In that case, any legal argument is vulnerable to what we might call justificatory ascent.
[2] Before he sits on his first case, he could build a gigantic,
[3] He could weave all that and everything else into a marvelously architectonic system.
[4] We reason from the inside-out: we begin with discrete problems forced upon us by occupation or responsibility or chance, and the scope of our inquiry is severely limited, not only by the time we have available, but by the arguments we happen actually to encounter or imagine. A judge reasoning from the inside-out will rarely find either the time or the need to undertake long, laborious research or argument.
[5] The first is offered by Judge Richard Posner. you know, the lazy judge who writes a book before breakfast, decides several cases before noon, teaches all
afternoon at the Chicago Law School, and performs brain surgery after dinner. The second is by an almost equally prolific colleague of his, Cass Sunstein, who also teaches at the Chicago Law School. n4 Together these scholars form a Chicago School of anti-theoretical, no-nonsense, jurisprudence. Both criticize the embedded conception of legal reasoning and endorse the practical one and both describe my own account of the former as a paradigm of the errors they hope to correct.
[6] That is why I have taken the Chicago School, and particularly Judge Posner and
Professor Sunstein, as examples. The arguments that they and others of similar opinion make against the use of moral or abstract theory in legal argument can usefully, I think, be shepherded under the following three headings: metaphysical, pragmatic(实用主义的), and professional.
[7]
[8]
experimental-are not the ones that leap to mind when one considers the work of, say, Ronald Dworkin.
[9]道义伦理(deontological ethics),就是和结果主义(consequentialism)或者目的论伦理(teleological ethics)--如实用主义、功利主义、至善主义等--相对的一种伦理哲学。一个行为是否正确,要靠行为本身来判断,而不是它的结果。行为的合乎伦理与否独立于这个行为带来的结果。而用结果主义和目的论伦理判断一个行为是否合乎道德,则只看这个行为产生的结果。
[10]
[11] But Sunstein suggests that lawyers and judges should abstain, even in the exercise of the responsibility of individual judgment, from venturing into the more abstract reaches of political moral theory. He means to claim, that is, not just that political and judicial alliances may be forged out of concrete agreement even in the face of theoretical divergence, but that the individual judgments that produce the concrete agreement should themselves be superficial.
[12]The concept of justificatory ascent is Dworkin's acknowledgment that judges more often reason upward from particular cases and arguments than downward from an overarching principle-such as egalitarianism, or utilitarianism, or Mill's conception of liberty-that makes the whole body of the law consistent. But he insists that through justificatory ascent a judge may be lofted to a high level of generality.
[13] [L]egal reasoning presupposes a vast domain of justification, including very abstract principles of political morality.
[14] By
theory. This conception is in the line of descent from Wechsler's influential article on
[15] The heart of Dworkin's conception, as earlier the conception of legal theory held by Wechsler and by Hart and Sacks, is the imposition of master themes, such as democratic legitimacy, or federalism, or relative institutional competence, or equality, on the particulars of the law.
[16] Twenty-five years of inconclusive debate about the political morality of
anti-abortion laws illustrate the limitations of argument in settling moral debate. This does not show that there are no moral truths, for there are unresolved scientific
debates older than the abortion debate, yet undoubtedly (or so I would argue) there are scientific truths.
[17] I said earlier that Dworkin's was one way of doing law. But it is not the best way. It is too abstract for a case-based legal system. It might do better in a regime of
2008年2月3日于成都市光华村西南财经大学法学院
如何法律思维?
——德沃金与波斯纳之争
吴 越
大凡国内的法律人已经知道了德沃金与波斯纳的PK; 两个NR你来我往无数回合,最终谁也没有说服谁,谁也没有打倒谁。不仅如此,尽管在二人在PK的过程中都有受伤,并且在PK过程中都暗自承认了对方观点的一些合理性,换言之,二人在PK的过程中越来越强壮,这符合苏格拉底式教学法的规律:不但真理愈辩愈明,辩论人也实现了教学相长。
在德沃金与波斯纳的较量中,鄙人认为最具有代表性的一次PK发生在1997年。这次争论在现在看来不但丝毫没有过时,而且现实似乎仍然在朝着中了二人之各自预言的方向发展。
本来,法学名流观点相左也不是什么新鲜事,背地里甚至贬低一下对方,骂一下人也不会有什么后果,但是德沃金非常NB,他终于忍不住公开骂人了(当然,波斯纳也不是好惹的,他损起人来,比德沃金还厉害)。1997年,应美国
因此,本文主要介绍一下二人讲座的主要内容,其依据也是上述两篇论文。
一、德沃金对波斯纳和桑斯坦的批判
首先来看德沃金的观点。按德沃金的说法,是波斯纳先招惹德沃金。众所周知,德沃金十分看重
第一个例子:避孕药的副作用。某美国妇女长期服用(各种)避孕药,后来身体受到伤害。但是她不知道或者不能证明究竟是哪个厂家生产的避孕药导致了她的伤害。争论的焦点是:美国的众多避孕药生产商是否应当对此伤害承担连带的损害赔偿责任?对此有两种对立的观点。第一种观点认为,由于本案中因果关系不明确,因此生产商将不可能承担任何责任,例如一些法院和美国最高法院均持这种观点。第二种观点则认为,尽管不能证明是哪家厂商的避孕药导致该妇女受到伤害,但是倘若她得不到赔偿,这将是一个宪法问题。
第二个例子:辅助性自杀(assisted suicide)。所谓辅助性自杀,也即在医生帮助下的
第三个例子:焚烧国旗。第一种观点认为,焚烧国旗是不道义的,并且是违宪的。第二种观点则认为,焚烧国旗其实是个人的表达自由的体现,因此是合法的。
第四个例子:堕胎。第一种观点认为,堕胎是合法的。第二种观点则认为,堕胎是违法的。
德沃金试图通过上述案件说明他的
紧接着,德沃金还通过希腊神话中的
[4]
总之,德沃金的论调是,法官在进行法律思维的时候,必须像海格力斯大力神那样,事先在心中装着各种理论与各种价值,通过理论和价值衡量来裁决具体纠纷。
然而,波斯纳在其1995年出版的著作
针对波斯纳的批评,德沃金回敬道,
德沃金进一步指出,波斯纳还
于是,德沃金要向波斯纳和桑斯坦发起反击,这也是为何德沃金专门找芝加哥学派算帐的根本原因。德沃金在讲座中批评波斯纳和桑斯坦犯了三大错误。他这样说道:
第一:形而上学(Metaphysics)。德沃金认为,政治伦理属于客观真理,例如存在着对种族屠杀、种族歧视和言论自由的普适性的伦理观念。反之,波斯纳则认为,并不存在所谓普适性的客观真理,也即不存在普适性的政治伦理。为此,德沃金是这样反驳的:
第二,实用主义(Pragmatics)。德沃金认为,波斯纳说他对法官裁判的评价理论并不依赖于哲学命题,而是独自成立的(free-standing)。为此,德沃金引用了波斯纳的一段话:
波斯纳强调法律思维的前瞻性(forward-looking)。对此,德沃金反驳说,前瞻式的法律思维本来就有两种含义。含义之一是法律思维是结果导向的,而不是道义伦理式的(deontological)[9]。含义之二是指福利主义者(welfarist),而不是结果导向的。倘若波斯纳注意到二者之间的区分的话,就应当意识到他自己误解了德沃金所主张的法律思维的理论根基观。因为在德沃金看来,主张法律思维的理论根基并不必然就是反功利主义的。而波斯纳的
内燃机的物理结构,试试各种办法看看其中一个是否灵验。
第三,职业主义(Professionalism)。所谓职业主义,是指一种倾向,按照这种倾向,法官或律师在思考问题时总是进行职业化的(或者说专业化的思维),这种思维拒绝理论,尤其是哲学理论。为此,德沃金以常人的口气形容道:
反之,德沃金则反驳说,其实桑斯坦这个人是自相矛盾的。因为桑斯坦自己也承认,
德沃金最后总结道:
二、波斯纳对德沃金反驳的反驳
针对德沃金的反驳,波斯纳也毫不示弱,对德沃金的观点进行了攻击。
首先,波斯纳指出,所谓
如
在此基础上,波斯纳认为,德沃金的所谓
波斯纳进一步指出,
(induction) 不可混淆。法官到达正义的顶点之后,他就将(理论的)梯子踢开了。由于被强迫爬上(正义的)梯子,法官承认,如果不采纳大原则他就无法判案,但是一旦采纳,他就判案了。
在厘清了德沃金理论的来龙去脉之后,波斯纳接着对德沃金对他的批判进行了反驳。
首先,波斯纳指出,
其次,波斯纳指出,德沃金的
第三,波斯纳指出,大多数的道德真理与科学真理不同,都是所谓
至于德沃金批评的
在最后,波斯纳承认,德沃金的法律思维观其实是从事法律工作的一种方式而已,也即不排除波斯纳自己的那种思维方式的存在。但德沃金的思维方式显然不是最佳途径。它对于判例法国家而言显然是太抽象了。它或许在
从以上的论战不难看出,尽管德沃金与波斯纳的争论,有相当一部分属于情绪化的争论,但是二人对于法律思维的路径之争却是有着非常重要的现实意义的。
注释:
[1] A claim of law-either that the drug victim wins or loses or that flag burning can or cannot constitutionally be prohibited-is tantamount to the claim, then, that one principle or another provides a better justification of some part of legal practice. Better in what way? Better interpretively- better, that is, because it fits the legal practice better, and puts it in a better light. In that case, any legal argument is vulnerable to what we might call justificatory ascent.
[2] Before he sits on his first case, he could build a gigantic,
[3] He could weave all that and everything else into a marvelously architectonic system.
[4] We reason from the inside-out: we begin with discrete problems forced upon us by occupation or responsibility or chance, and the scope of our inquiry is severely limited, not only by the time we have available, but by the arguments we happen actually to encounter or imagine. A judge reasoning from the inside-out will rarely find either the time or the need to undertake long, laborious research or argument.
[5] The first is offered by Judge Richard Posner. you know, the lazy judge who writes a book before breakfast, decides several cases before noon, teaches all
afternoon at the Chicago Law School, and performs brain surgery after dinner. The second is by an almost equally prolific colleague of his, Cass Sunstein, who also teaches at the Chicago Law School. n4 Together these scholars form a Chicago School of anti-theoretical, no-nonsense, jurisprudence. Both criticize the embedded conception of legal reasoning and endorse the practical one and both describe my own account of the former as a paradigm of the errors they hope to correct.
[6] That is why I have taken the Chicago School, and particularly Judge Posner and
Professor Sunstein, as examples. The arguments that they and others of similar opinion make against the use of moral or abstract theory in legal argument can usefully, I think, be shepherded under the following three headings: metaphysical, pragmatic(实用主义的), and professional.
[7]
[8]
experimental-are not the ones that leap to mind when one considers the work of, say, Ronald Dworkin.
[9]道义伦理(deontological ethics),就是和结果主义(consequentialism)或者目的论伦理(teleological ethics)--如实用主义、功利主义、至善主义等--相对的一种伦理哲学。一个行为是否正确,要靠行为本身来判断,而不是它的结果。行为的合乎伦理与否独立于这个行为带来的结果。而用结果主义和目的论伦理判断一个行为是否合乎道德,则只看这个行为产生的结果。
[10]
[11] But Sunstein suggests that lawyers and judges should abstain, even in the exercise of the responsibility of individual judgment, from venturing into the more abstract reaches of political moral theory. He means to claim, that is, not just that political and judicial alliances may be forged out of concrete agreement even in the face of theoretical divergence, but that the individual judgments that produce the concrete agreement should themselves be superficial.
[12]The concept of justificatory ascent is Dworkin's acknowledgment that judges more often reason upward from particular cases and arguments than downward from an overarching principle-such as egalitarianism, or utilitarianism, or Mill's conception of liberty-that makes the whole body of the law consistent. But he insists that through justificatory ascent a judge may be lofted to a high level of generality.
[13] [L]egal reasoning presupposes a vast domain of justification, including very abstract principles of political morality.
[14] By
theory. This conception is in the line of descent from Wechsler's influential article on
[15] The heart of Dworkin's conception, as earlier the conception of legal theory held by Wechsler and by Hart and Sacks, is the imposition of master themes, such as democratic legitimacy, or federalism, or relative institutional competence, or equality, on the particulars of the law.
[16] Twenty-five years of inconclusive debate about the political morality of
anti-abortion laws illustrate the limitations of argument in settling moral debate. This does not show that there are no moral truths, for there are unresolved scientific
debates older than the abortion debate, yet undoubtedly (or so I would argue) there are scientific truths.
[17] I said earlier that Dworkin's was one way of doing law. But it is not the best way. It is too abstract for a case-based legal system. It might do better in a regime of
2008年2月3日于成都市光华村西南财经大学法学院