英文原文
Mandatory Accounting Disclosure
Material Source: Mandatory Accounting Disclosure by Small Private Companies
Author: Benito Arrunada
There are substantial differences in the regulation in differeni couniries on financial disclosure by private companies and, in particular, on publication of their accounts.In the USA, Japan and some other countries, most private companies, whatever [heir size, arc not obliged to disclose financial information.In contrast, in the European Union all companies arc required to file their accounts with a public register. Most other countries also require many of their private companies to publicly file their accounts.
Discussions of these disclosure and publication requirements have led to disparate recommendations to slightly expand publication requirements, maintain them and reduce them, Singapore. More recently, as pari of its initiative to simplify the business environment and lessen administrative burdens, the European Commission(2007)has also proposed to exempt small companies so that they would not necessarily be required by national law to publish their accounts. The Commission grounds its proposal on the argument that for such companies publishing the accounts causes considerable cost with no significant benefit. On the one hand, according to the Commission, the requirement constitutes a major adminisirative burden. On the other ，it is inconsequential if~when given freedom to disclose or not一small firms choose not to
disclose because iheir accounts are only"used by a limited number of stakeholders,such as credit institutions and suppliers that have the possibility lo require financial information dircctly from the company".
Mandatory publication of accounts by private companies relates to several strands of the economic, accounting and financial litcraturcs:dcregulation of business formalities, mandatory financial disclosure, and investors protection and crcdit information. Findings in all these areas thus provide complementary insights on【he issue under discussion.
Since the 1960s, there has been substantial controversy on the balance of costs and benefits and the optimal conteni of mandatory financial disclosure. In the current regulatory framework of the USA, however,mast of these discussions have focused on mandatory disclosure by public companies~that is, companies selling shares or bonds to individual investors in stock exchanges. These public companies arc required by law to not only file financial information publicly on a periodic basis but also【o disclosc oihcr information on the company, provide detailed data on new issues of securities and report any trade by insiders.
Even though the European Commission's proposal refers to the mandatory publication of annual accounts by small private companies, part of the discussion on mandatory disclosure by
public companies is applicable. Other parts of the analysis are substantially different, however, because of differences in the governance structure, size and availability of information of both types of companies, as well as differences in the contents of the information being mandatorily disclosed.In particular, previous research has focused on how mandatory disclosure for public companies affects the value of their equity by facilitating or not transactions on such equity. But the main interest for private companies lies in knowing how publishing their accounts could help their trading parties(mainly banks and suppliers)estimate their credit risk, thus expanding their access to credit and lowering its cost. The main effect should be lo reduce information asymmetry in credit(inc]uding trade credit)transaciions instead of in equily transactions.
In addition, given that the shares of public companies are traded in the stock market, it is
possible to estimate the impact of mandatory disclosure on the value of the public companies. However, even if the reduction in the transaction costs of credit causcd by mandatory publication of accounts also increases firm value, wc cannot measure this effcct bccausc wc lack market prices for equity shares in private companies. Therefore, without a comprehensive inctric for evaluating ihc impact of mandatory publication of accounts,wc can only aspire to building an enlightened qualitative inventory of costs and benefits. The volume of credit contracted in an economy depends on two factors:informacian available on debtors quality, and the rights that the legal system grants to creditors in case of default. For the availability of information, the factor on which we are most interested, empirical evidence shows that the volume of credit grows when banks share more information on debtors and when the quality of credit registries improves. It seems that the better the creditors know the quality and record of potential debtors, the lower the transaction costs of credit, probably because of both improved debtors incentives and easier avoidance of adverse selection. As we will see, the main reason for the
publication of accounts is that ic allows improved assessment of crcdit risk for both individual transactions and bank and macrocconomic regulation.
Distortion of competition
Publication of accounts might also cause private costs to the disclosing firm by informing its competitors, which might also distort competition. However, this effect seems unlikely to be substantial when small companies are involved. At least, these costs are clearly smaller than those of the disclosure now commonly required from public companies. A useful comparison would be that between the impact of publicly filing the annual accounts with that of announcing, for instance, the cancellation of a research programme. Doubt remains on this point, however, not for the micro and small companies considered by the European Commission but for medium-sized or even large private companies, for which disclosure may be quite sensitive,given their size and presence in concentrated and difTerentiated markets.
Mapping appropriable benefits
Publication of company accounts also provides benefits to the companies involved, to their trading partners and to third parlies. This section examines those which are appropriable by the disclosing company.
Benefits for disclosers and their partners
Benefits for disclosing companies and their trading partners arise from reducing 【he information asymmetry between【hem: publishing the accounts grants acccss to potential and current trading partners to the historical record, current financial position and profitability of the disclosing firm. This reduction in information asymmetry is especially valuable in transactions that embody future obligations for the firm:clients purchasing durable goods, all parties investing in firm-specific assets, minority shareholders and, especially, trade and financial creditors. Understandably, more transparent firms have been found to incur lower costs of debt and equity capital.
Furthermore, publishing the accounts may be more credible and less costly than communicating them individually to contractual parties or handing them only to those parties who request them explicitly. Credibility is gained because filing the accounts with an independent third party(the register)commits the firm, as accounts already filed cannot be modified and future accounts will have to be consisleni wilh ihose filed in the pasl.Costs are reduced because it is no longer necessary to deliver them to a high number of trade creditors, and prospective creditors or third parties will no longer have lo ask for the accounts lo be delivered to iheni.
Individual disclosure as an alternative to public disclosure
The alternative solution proposed by the European Commission is for the creditor to ask for the borrowers financial statements. This solution is problematic, not least because there are often more than two parties to the transaction.
Information provided to a party in a one-to-one interaction is often less credible than that provided to all potential parties by filing it in a public registry. Some evidence on this is given by the common practice in banking of, as a first step, checking loan applications!which often include specifically adapted financial statements)against reports prepared by business.information agencies. 19 One may assume that if some credit applicants make up their accounts when dealing with banks, they are even more likely to do so when dealing with suppliers, given (hat suppliers are not experts in crcdii evaluation, do not have such ready acccss to additional information and arc less likely to be a party in future transactions.
In addition, asking contractual parties for sensitive information is not always a sensible negotiating strategy, bccausc it may destroy trust, which might he needed to adapt the transaction in the future. It may force the transaction to be more formal and legalistic. This seems especially imponani when making credit decisions as by-products of commercial transactions,many of which need future
adaptation. On the other hand ，explicit contracting for safeguards is relatively more common and accepted for credit than for commercial transactions, and fewer adaptations are needed.
Mapping externalities
Every time a company publishes its accounts, it benefits third parties in ways that could hardly compensate the disclosing company in any practical way. Aggregated information on individual firms, even if very small, is valuable for credit information agencies, to improve the accuracy and predictive power of their credit rating models; for analysts and investors, as it allows them to do comparative analysis when allocating capital among firms and industries; for competitors and competitors' investors, when analysing the industr>'； for regulators and policymakers, when making decisions; for ccntral banks, when evaluating the level of indebtness of the economy and the soundness of banks; and even for researchers doing empirical work.
One may cxpect that these cffects would also indircctly benefit other economic agents, both at the micro and macrocconomic levels. This is the ease,in particular, of credit information, bank regulation and national accounting.
Externalities in credit information
Financial information agencies produce reports containing all sorts of information thai is. of use for evaluating companies' creditworthiness. These reports ， which may be customised depending on the
needs of the client, often include several years of accounts as filed at ihe Company Register and the identity of the companies' shareholders and legal representatives. In addition, not only for companies bul also for individual firms, reports might also include, if available, negative information about previous defaults, as filed by trade and financial creditors and courts, as well as contact information and news clips on the firm.As a summary, they may also offer a crcdit rating or even an estimated probability of default.
The accounts filed with the Company Register arc a major componcni of crcdit reports，because of the problems plaguing alternative sources of information. Exclusive reliance on negative information about credit defaults worsens the quality of credit assessment, and financial institutions are often unwilling to share positive information on debtors.Furthennore,even sharing arrangements depend on the cooperation of established financial institutions, which poses serious risks to competition.
Externalities in national accounting
When building the financial accounts of national economies, many central banks rely partly on the financial statements of non-financial firms, mainly to produce information on【heir financial operations. Some countries have developed specific databases of accounts, lo which firms send their accounts voluntarily,getting in return privileged access to aggregate inforination on their industry and the economv.
Participation, however, tends to be low and suffers from several biases~e.g. large firms are more inclined lo participate. This makes it necessary lo complement the analysis of their own databases with the accounts of small companies.
Do firms balance costs and benefits well?
Voluntary decisions by rational decision makers may deviate from the optimal trade-off of costs and benefits for two main reasons: the asymmetric structure of the information available and the prcscncc of externalities. In addition, this balancing of costs and benefits may also be hindered when the decision maker deviates from rationality.
Information asymmetry constraints
In situations of information asymmetry, parties who are better informed may lend to voluntarily disclose their information to uninformed parties to avoid their inferring the worst and reading accordingly, withdrawing their cooperation or taking precautionary measures. Some evidence on the presence of incentives for voluntary disclosure by private firms is provided,for instance, by the common practice of credit rating agencies, of using as an indicator of creditworthiness the fact that a company keeps all sorts of registrations up to date:from its listing in the telephone directory to its file in the company register.
Informed parties may not disclose the information,however, when one of rhe following assumptions does not hold: (I)When disclosure is costly,the possibility that uninformed trading parties will infer the worst from nondisclosure does not necessarily provide enough incentives to disclose. (2)For the same reason, a similar outcome arises when it is not publicly known if the informed party is wel】 informed or not.
(3)When noi all uninformed parlies understand the information, their lack of understanding may limit the benefits of disclosure for good firms and finns may end up in a nondisclosure equilibrium. (4)When ihe informed party cannot disclose all information(for instance, because it would have to prepare several sets of financial statements using different principles, which would be prohibitively expensive), a rule constraining disclosure choice will increase the value of【he disclosed infonnation.
For disclosure of financial statements by private small companies, three of these assumptions do not hold, hindering voluntary disclosure. First, disclosure is costly, which may deter voluntary disclosure and cause confusion in the signal sent by non-disclosure. Second, it is public knowledge that companies have financial statements, which they use for their own management, so the second assumption does not hold. Third ，a substantial proportion of market participants probably do not fully understand the accounts. Fourth, mandatory accounting principles are needed to increase the value of the information by limiting discretion.
Difficulties for internalising externalities
The most important reason for subaptimal disclosure is the presence of externalities: firms lack incentives to voluntarily disclose the optimal amount of information，given that they internalise some bur
not all the social benefits of disclosure. Furthermore, the use of computers and the Iniernet has increased the value of these externalities by making ii possible to aggregate the information in the accounts and 10 distribute the information lo millions of users more cheaply and promptly.
译文
强制性会计信息披露
资料来源：小型私人公司强制性会计信息披跞 作者：贝尼托
不同W 家在金融监管私背公司和披跞，特别足关干他们的帐户披露， 大差异。在美闽，口木和其他一贱国家，大多数私营公司，无论其大小，没蒋 义务披露财务佶息。々此+11反，在欧洲联盟的所苻公司必须要h 公众披露。大 多数其他_家的帐户也需耍他们的私人公司的许多公开文件的帐户。
这吟披銪通过讨论和犮表给出不同的建议，导致轻微扩大披露的需求，并 且去维护他们，减少他们。最近，为主动简化背商环境，减轻行政负担的一部 分，欧洲委员会（2007) 亦建议豁免小公_司，他们不需要遒循H 家法律来披 露他们的账户。委员会给出的建议，即这呰公司帐R 产生的原因，没苻明益的 好处却花了相当大的成本。一方ilil, 根据委员会的要求足一项里大的行政负担。 另一方面，当给定的£1由，让企业选择不透露他们的帐户，因为他们的帐户只 足“被少甭的股东使用，如佶ffl 机构和供应商冇可能会要求fl:按从财务信息使 iTT «
强制性的披器公司帐户涉及到的经济，会计及财务文献：业务手续，强制 性的财务信息披雜，投资者的保护和在所汾这些领域的佶用信息，从而发现放 松管制下提供的补充讨论的问题的见解.
20世纪60年代，出现了对成本和效益以及财务披豁的强制性内容最佳平 衡的争论。但足，芙闺II 前的监管机构人部分集中在丄市公司的强制信息披辦， 也就足说，企业在证券交舄所出ffi 股票或偾券给个人投资者。这呰上帘公司被 法律规定，不仅财务佶息耍定期公开披滿，而.R 还要披露公司的其他佶息，提 出对证券新问题的详细数据，报告所有内部贸易。
欧盟委员会的建议，上市公司的强制倍息披露的讨论部分, 适用年度帐目 小型私人公司的强制性披露。仴其他部分明显不同，在治理结构，规模和两种 类型的公司信息的差异, 以及在该资料的内容差异，被强制性披辦。特别是， 以往的研宄集中于如何为上市公司强制性信息披滿影响了他们的权益提供便利 或不公平交易的价值等。怛对私菏公司的耍兴趣在T •知道如何披露LJ 己的帐 户可以帮助他们的交场各方（主耍足银行和供应商〉估算其信用风险，从而扩 大其获得佶贷和降低其成木。其主要作用应该足减少佶贷（包栝贸易信贷）的 信息不对称，而不是在股权交易。
此外，鉴于-丨：市公司的股票在股市交妨，有可能•足强制披露对上市公間价 值产生了影响。然而，即使在信用账户造成的强制交易成本也增加公司价值， 我们不能衡景这个效果，因为我们缺乏私人公nj 股权的市场价格。因此，如果 没有一个强制性披露帐n 的佶息，我们只能渴望建立一个综合指标，以成木和 效益开明的定性库存。
最后，强制性的财务披露在经济增长中犮挥关键作用，因为它是为了 “保 护”均投资者和馈权人的交易的公司法律制度的重耍组成部分。强制性的财务 披露起着经济增长的关键作用，金融犮展是经济增长的重要因素。人多数硏宄 集中于上市公司在股票市场的交易上, 但类似的索赔, 有关私营公司，主要考 虑到对信贷成本的证据。在经济上，信用额度取决于两个因索：对债务人的质 量提供信息，并在违约的情况下权利的法律制度补助给偾权人。我们在意信息 因索的可用性，经验证椐显示，信贷供应量增长时，当银行对债务人分莩更多 的信息和信贷登记时，质量提高。肴来，更好的质量和债权人知道债务人的潜 在纪录，降低信贷交易成本，可能是因为既提高了债务人激励和逆卯选择更容 易避免。正如我们将
肴到的，披露的帐户锒主要的原因足它允许佶用风险改进 评估为个人交易，银行和宏观调控。 竞争扭曲
帐户信息披蔣会导致私人成本的披跞，使事务所通知其竞争对f •，这可能 扭曲竞争。然而，似乎不太可能大多小公司都参」•』_。至少，这呰成本显然比现 在普遍耍求对从上〗丨/公司披露的小。公幵申报的与该年度账户披落相比较将足 一个冇用的影响。例如，一个研宄项R 被取消。然而，并非由欧洲委员会审议 的微型和小型公司在这一点上都苻疑闷。由于其规模和市场集中和苻区别的存 在，中型甚至大型私营公司对此披露到是相当敏感。 投资者可占有优势
公司账户披辂还使贸妨伙伴和第二方公司受益。本i!f 探讨哪鸣足可受益的 披露公司。
披露者和他的合作伙伴
账户信息披露给公司贸易伙伴带来好处，减少它们之间的信息不对称：账 户信息披露使公司的投资者了解公司的财政状况和企业盈利能力^这种佶息不 对称的减少，尤其体现在公司未来愤务的价值：客户购买耐用消费品，各方在 公司特定资产，少数股东，特别足贸易和佥融债权人的投资。可以理解的，更 透明的公司己经犮现要支付偾务和股权资本成本较低。
此外，勾合同当事人移交给他们的个人通信相比，披跞的账户可能更可靠， 只軒那呰谁要求他们明确各方成本更低。信用足闽为申请获衍„独立第二方(登 记）的帐n 提交公司，如己经提出帐户不能被修改和今后的帐户将要与过去提 出的-致。成本的降低，因为它不再需耍他们提供大量的贸易偾权人，偾权人 和潜在的第三方将不洱有耍求的帐h 交付给他们。 个人披露作为替代公幵披露
为一种方案，由欧盟委员会提出的对偾权人耍求借款人的财务报表。这个 解决方案足布问题的，这足因为往往苻两个以上当事方的交易。
提供的信息在一对一的互动，以较少的一方往往比提供可信在市场上提交 给所轲潜在的各方。这足在银行给予的普遍做法，作为第一步，检资编写的报 告对贷款按业务应用程序（通常包牯特别适合财务报表）。这种信息不对称的减 少，尤其体现在交幼对公司未来愤务的价值：客户购买耐用消费品，各方在公 司特定资产，少数股东，特别足贸妫和金融愤权人的投资。可以理解的，更透 明的公司己经发现耍支付偾务和股权资本成本较低。
此外，耍求对敏感信息的合同当琪人并不一定足明智的谈判策略，因为它 可能会破坏佶任，这可能耑耍适应未来的交埸。它可能会迫使更多的交妫的IE 式tt 和法律性。这似乎足特别里耍时按商业交埸，其中有许多需耍迠应未来的 副产品佶贷决策。另一方面，为保障明确締约扣对较常见的和非商业交易的信 用接受，较少的修改是必要的。 外部映射
每一个公司披露其帐户，它使第二方受益，难以补偿披滿的公司^对个别 公司的资料汇总，即使很少，是衧价值的佶用佶息机构，以提商准确性和他们 的信用评级模型的预测能力：为分祈师和投资者，在资木和企业之间分配产业 时，它允许他们做对比分析：在分析产业时，考虑竞争者和竞争对r •的投资者 悄况；在作出决定时，考虑监管机构和决策者的悄况；对丁•中央银行，正确评 佔负债经济和银行的稳健水平；做好工作的研宂人员猓至经验《^
人们可以预期，无论足在微观和宏观层次的其他经济主体，这些影响都将 间接受益。特别是信用信息，银行监育和闺民经济核算。 外部信用信息
佥融信息机构产生的报告戟柯各种信息，这足评价企业的信用使用。这呰 报告，可能足根据丨' j 定义的客户端的需求而定，通常包拈数年的帐户为在公司 登记和公司的股东和法定代表人的身份提起。此外，不仅对公司，而ji 也为个 别公司，如果有的话，报告还包括，存关以前拖欠的负面信息，如贸易和金融 偾权人和法院存档，以及联系方式和对公司的新闻片段。作为一个总结，他们 也可以提供信用评级，甚至楚违约概率的估计。
公司登记备案的决算是信丨丨】报告的重耍组成部分，以及闹扰的其他信息来 源的问题。对苻关佶贷违约的负面佶息卓卉的依赖加剧了信用评估的质量，金 融机构往往不愿分皁愦务人的枳极信息。此外，即使丼卒安排取决于既定的金 融机构的合作，这对竞争构成严甫威胁。 br 经济核算的外部性
W 家经济建设的财务帐许多中央银fj •在•定程度丨•. 依赖II. •金融公司的 财务报表，主耍产少其金融业务的佶息。一呰闽家己经制定了具体的数据库的 帐R ，而公司主动送CJ 己的帐户，以换取他们的特权获得工业和佶息获取的经 济总量。
然而，大公司更倾向于参々账户信息披露，小公司参々较少。这就需耍补 充与小公司的帐冃0己的数据库分析。
如何平衡企业成本和效益？
决策者D 愿作出决定可能会偏离合理的最伸贸易销S 成木和效益，主耍冇 两个原因：在信息不对称的结构可用和存在外部性。此外，这种利益平衡成本 也可能受到阻碍，决策者理性偏离。 信息不对称约束
在信息不对称的情况下，为更好地了解各方可能倾向〒丨丨丨愿披辦信息，他 们推断朴丨应反应，撤消其合作或采取预防措施。对一拽由私人公司丨丨丨愿披谿信 息存在的证据提供原囡，例如，由信用评级机构的共同做法，作为一种信用指 标使ffl —个事实，即公刁保留了各种登记注册为最新信息：从其在电话目录中 的上市公司。
知情各方不得披羝这些信息，但足，当出现以下假设时不成立：当披露是 吊贵的，"J ■能足不了解情况的交幼双方将保密，从最坏的推断并不一定提供足 够的诱因透露：出于同样的原因，不公幵的，类似的结果出现时，当告知当琳 人充分知情々否：当不足所ff 不知情各方了解的佶息，他们的现解不足可能限 制了好的企业和公司披露的权益在一份保密的平衡中； 当告知当褀人不能披露所苻资料(例如，K 为它必须编制财务报表若干套采用 不间的原则，这将非常昂贵〉，规则限制披露的选择将增加披露的信息的价值。
就财务报表披滿私人小公司，这鸣假设其中二个不成立，阻碍D 愿披菇。 首先，信息披露足昴资的，这可能阻止由非公幵发出的信号自愿披露，造成混 乱。第二，它足公共知识，公司财务报表，他们使用己的管理，所以第二个 假设不成立。三足相当一部分市场参与者可能不完全明白的帐第叫，强制 性的会计原则是需耍酌情增加，这限制了信息的价值。
外部性内在化的难点
对r •次优披辦:gi 要的原闲足外部性的存在：企业缺乏D 愿披辦信息的激 励机制，因为它们内部化一些，但并非所有披露社会效益々此外，使用电脑和 互联网己增加使得可能聚集在帐丨1和分犮的资料，更便立的数山•万用户，及时 的信息，上数这鸬外部闽索的价值。
英文原文
Mandatory Accounting Disclosure
Material Source: Mandatory Accounting Disclosure by Small Private Companies
Author: Benito Arrunada
There are substantial differences in the regulation in differeni couniries on financial disclosure by private companies and, in particular, on publication of their accounts.In the USA, Japan and some other countries, most private companies, whatever [heir size, arc not obliged to disclose financial information.In contrast, in the European Union all companies arc required to file their accounts with a public register. Most other countries also require many of their private companies to publicly file their accounts.
Discussions of these disclosure and publication requirements have led to disparate recommendations to slightly expand publication requirements, maintain them and reduce them, Singapore. More recently, as pari of its initiative to simplify the business environment and lessen administrative burdens, the European Commission(2007)has also proposed to exempt small companies so that they would not necessarily be required by national law to publish their accounts. The Commission grounds its proposal on the argument that for such companies publishing the accounts causes considerable cost with no significant benefit. On the one hand, according to the Commission, the requirement constitutes a major adminisirative burden. On the other ，it is inconsequential if~when given freedom to disclose or not一small firms choose not to
disclose because iheir accounts are only"used by a limited number of stakeholders,such as credit institutions and suppliers that have the possibility lo require financial information dircctly from the company".
Mandatory publication of accounts by private companies relates to several strands of the economic, accounting and financial litcraturcs:dcregulation of business formalities, mandatory financial disclosure, and investors protection and crcdit information. Findings in all these areas thus provide complementary insights on【he issue under discussion.
Since the 1960s, there has been substantial controversy on the balance of costs and benefits and the optimal conteni of mandatory financial disclosure. In the current regulatory framework of the USA, however,mast of these discussions have focused on mandatory disclosure by public companies~that is, companies selling shares or bonds to individual investors in stock exchanges. These public companies arc required by law to not only file financial information publicly on a periodic basis but also【o disclosc oihcr information on the company, provide detailed data on new issues of securities and report any trade by insiders.
Even though the European Commission's proposal refers to the mandatory publication of annual accounts by small private companies, part of the discussion on mandatory disclosure by
public companies is applicable. Other parts of the analysis are substantially different, however, because of differences in the governance structure, size and availability of information of both types of companies, as well as differences in the contents of the information being mandatorily disclosed.In particular, previous research has focused on how mandatory disclosure for public companies affects the value of their equity by facilitating or not transactions on such equity. But the main interest for private companies lies in knowing how publishing their accounts could help their trading parties(mainly banks and suppliers)estimate their credit risk, thus expanding their access to credit and lowering its cost. The main effect should be lo reduce information asymmetry in credit(inc]uding trade credit)transaciions instead of in equily transactions.
In addition, given that the shares of public companies are traded in the stock market, it is
possible to estimate the impact of mandatory disclosure on the value of the public companies. However, even if the reduction in the transaction costs of credit causcd by mandatory publication of accounts also increases firm value, wc cannot measure this effcct bccausc wc lack market prices for equity shares in private companies. Therefore, without a comprehensive inctric for evaluating ihc impact of mandatory publication of accounts,wc can only aspire to building an enlightened qualitative inventory of costs and benefits. The volume of credit contracted in an economy depends on two factors:informacian available on debtors quality, and the rights that the legal system grants to creditors in case of default. For the availability of information, the factor on which we are most interested, empirical evidence shows that the volume of credit grows when banks share more information on debtors and when the quality of credit registries improves. It seems that the better the creditors know the quality and record of potential debtors, the lower the transaction costs of credit, probably because of both improved debtors incentives and easier avoidance of adverse selection. As we will see, the main reason for the
publication of accounts is that ic allows improved assessment of crcdit risk for both individual transactions and bank and macrocconomic regulation.
Distortion of competition
Publication of accounts might also cause private costs to the disclosing firm by informing its competitors, which might also distort competition. However, this effect seems unlikely to be substantial when small companies are involved. At least, these costs are clearly smaller than those of the disclosure now commonly required from public companies. A useful comparison would be that between the impact of publicly filing the annual accounts with that of announcing, for instance, the cancellation of a research programme. Doubt remains on this point, however, not for the micro and small companies considered by the European Commission but for medium-sized or even large private companies, for which disclosure may be quite sensitive,given their size and presence in concentrated and difTerentiated markets.
Mapping appropriable benefits
Publication of company accounts also provides benefits to the companies involved, to their trading partners and to third parlies. This section examines those which are appropriable by the disclosing company.
Benefits for disclosers and their partners
Benefits for disclosing companies and their trading partners arise from reducing 【he information asymmetry between【hem: publishing the accounts grants acccss to potential and current trading partners to the historical record, current financial position and profitability of the disclosing firm. This reduction in information asymmetry is especially valuable in transactions that embody future obligations for the firm:clients purchasing durable goods, all parties investing in firm-specific assets, minority shareholders and, especially, trade and financial creditors. Understandably, more transparent firms have been found to incur lower costs of debt and equity capital.
Furthermore, publishing the accounts may be more credible and less costly than communicating them individually to contractual parties or handing them only to those parties who request them explicitly. Credibility is gained because filing the accounts with an independent third party(the register)commits the firm, as accounts already filed cannot be modified and future accounts will have to be consisleni wilh ihose filed in the pasl.Costs are reduced because it is no longer necessary to deliver them to a high number of trade creditors, and prospective creditors or third parties will no longer have lo ask for the accounts lo be delivered to iheni.
Individual disclosure as an alternative to public disclosure
The alternative solution proposed by the European Commission is for the creditor to ask for the borrowers financial statements. This solution is problematic, not least because there are often more than two parties to the transaction.
Information provided to a party in a one-to-one interaction is often less credible than that provided to all potential parties by filing it in a public registry. Some evidence on this is given by the common practice in banking of, as a first step, checking loan applications!which often include specifically adapted financial statements)against reports prepared by business.information agencies. 19 One may assume that if some credit applicants make up their accounts when dealing with banks, they are even more likely to do so when dealing with suppliers, given (hat suppliers are not experts in crcdii evaluation, do not have such ready acccss to additional information and arc less likely to be a party in future transactions.
In addition, asking contractual parties for sensitive information is not always a sensible negotiating strategy, bccausc it may destroy trust, which might he needed to adapt the transaction in the future. It may force the transaction to be more formal and legalistic. This seems especially imponani when making credit decisions as by-products of commercial transactions,many of which need future
adaptation. On the other hand ，explicit contracting for safeguards is relatively more common and accepted for credit than for commercial transactions, and fewer adaptations are needed.
Mapping externalities
Every time a company publishes its accounts, it benefits third parties in ways that could hardly compensate the disclosing company in any practical way. Aggregated information on individual firms, even if very small, is valuable for credit information agencies, to improve the accuracy and predictive power of their credit rating models; for analysts and investors, as it allows them to do comparative analysis when allocating capital among firms and industries; for competitors and competitors' investors, when analysing the industr>'； for regulators and policymakers, when making decisions; for ccntral banks, when evaluating the level of indebtness of the economy and the soundness of banks; and even for researchers doing empirical work.
One may cxpect that these cffects would also indircctly benefit other economic agents, both at the micro and macrocconomic levels. This is the ease,in particular, of credit information, bank regulation and national accounting.
Externalities in credit information
Financial information agencies produce reports containing all sorts of information thai is. of use for evaluating companies' creditworthiness. These reports ， which may be customised depending on the
needs of the client, often include several years of accounts as filed at ihe Company Register and the identity of the companies' shareholders and legal representatives. In addition, not only for companies bul also for individual firms, reports might also include, if available, negative information about previous defaults, as filed by trade and financial creditors and courts, as well as contact information and news clips on the firm.As a summary, they may also offer a crcdit rating or even an estimated probability of default.
The accounts filed with the Company Register arc a major componcni of crcdit reports，because of the problems plaguing alternative sources of information. Exclusive reliance on negative information about credit defaults worsens the quality of credit assessment, and financial institutions are often unwilling to share positive information on debtors.Furthennore,even sharing arrangements depend on the cooperation of established financial institutions, which poses serious risks to competition.
Externalities in national accounting
When building the financial accounts of national economies, many central banks rely partly on the financial statements of non-financial firms, mainly to produce information on【heir financial operations. Some countries have developed specific databases of accounts, lo which firms send their accounts voluntarily,getting in return privileged access to aggregate inforination on their industry and the economv.
Participation, however, tends to be low and suffers from several biases~e.g. large firms are more inclined lo participate. This makes it necessary lo complement the analysis of their own databases with the accounts of small companies.
Do firms balance costs and benefits well?
Voluntary decisions by rational decision makers may deviate from the optimal trade-off of costs and benefits for two main reasons: the asymmetric structure of the information available and the prcscncc of externalities. In addition, this balancing of costs and benefits may also be hindered when the decision maker deviates from rationality.
Information asymmetry constraints
In situations of information asymmetry, parties who are better informed may lend to voluntarily disclose their information to uninformed parties to avoid their inferring the worst and reading accordingly, withdrawing their cooperation or taking precautionary measures. Some evidence on the presence of incentives for voluntary disclosure by private firms is provided,for instance, by the common practice of credit rating agencies, of using as an indicator of creditworthiness the fact that a company keeps all sorts of registrations up to date:from its listing in the telephone directory to its file in the company register.
Informed parties may not disclose the information,however, when one of rhe following assumptions does not hold: (I)When disclosure is costly,the possibility that uninformed trading parties will infer the worst from nondisclosure does not necessarily provide enough incentives to disclose. (2)For the same reason, a similar outcome arises when it is not publicly known if the informed party is wel】 informed or not.
(3)When noi all uninformed parlies understand the information, their lack of understanding may limit the benefits of disclosure for good firms and finns may end up in a nondisclosure equilibrium. (4)When ihe informed party cannot disclose all information(for instance, because it would have to prepare several sets of financial statements using different principles, which would be prohibitively expensive), a rule constraining disclosure choice will increase the value of【he disclosed infonnation.
For disclosure of financial statements by private small companies, three of these assumptions do not hold, hindering voluntary disclosure. First, disclosure is costly, which may deter voluntary disclosure and cause confusion in the signal sent by non-disclosure. Second, it is public knowledge that companies have financial statements, which they use for their own management, so the second assumption does not hold. Third ，a substantial proportion of market participants probably do not fully understand the accounts. Fourth, mandatory accounting principles are needed to increase the value of the information by limiting discretion.
Difficulties for internalising externalities
The most important reason for subaptimal disclosure is the presence of externalities: firms lack incentives to voluntarily disclose the optimal amount of information，given that they internalise some bur
not all the social benefits of disclosure. Furthermore, the use of computers and the Iniernet has increased the value of these externalities by making ii possible to aggregate the information in the accounts and 10 distribute the information lo millions of users more cheaply and promptly.
译文
强制性会计信息披露
资料来源：小型私人公司强制性会计信息披跞 作者：贝尼托
不同W 家在金融监管私背公司和披跞，特别足关干他们的帐户披露， 大差异。在美闽，口木和其他一贱国家，大多数私营公司，无论其大小，没蒋 义务披露财务佶息。々此+11反，在欧洲联盟的所苻公司必须要h 公众披露。大 多数其他_家的帐户也需耍他们的私人公司的许多公开文件的帐户。
这吟披銪通过讨论和犮表给出不同的建议，导致轻微扩大披露的需求，并 且去维护他们，减少他们。最近，为主动简化背商环境，减轻行政负担的一部 分，欧洲委员会（2007) 亦建议豁免小公_司，他们不需要遒循H 家法律来披 露他们的账户。委员会给出的建议，即这呰公司帐R 产生的原因，没苻明益的 好处却花了相当大的成本。一方ilil, 根据委员会的要求足一项里大的行政负担。 另一方面，当给定的£1由，让企业选择不透露他们的帐户，因为他们的帐户只 足“被少甭的股东使用，如佶ffl 机构和供应商冇可能会要求fl:按从财务信息使 iTT «
强制性的披器公司帐户涉及到的经济，会计及财务文献：业务手续，强制 性的财务信息披雜，投资者的保护和在所汾这些领域的佶用信息，从而发现放 松管制下提供的补充讨论的问题的见解.
20世纪60年代，出现了对成本和效益以及财务披豁的强制性内容最佳平 衡的争论。但足，芙闺II 前的监管机构人部分集中在丄市公司的强制信息披辦， 也就足说，企业在证券交舄所出ffi 股票或偾券给个人投资者。这呰上帘公司被 法律规定，不仅财务佶息耍定期公开披滿，而.R 还要披露公司的其他佶息，提 出对证券新问题的详细数据，报告所有内部贸易。
欧盟委员会的建议，上市公司的强制倍息披露的讨论部分, 适用年度帐目 小型私人公司的强制性披露。仴其他部分明显不同，在治理结构，规模和两种 类型的公司信息的差异, 以及在该资料的内容差异，被强制性披辦。特别是， 以往的研宄集中于如何为上市公司强制性信息披滿影响了他们的权益提供便利 或不公平交易的价值等。怛对私菏公司的耍兴趣在T •知道如何披露LJ 己的帐 户可以帮助他们的交场各方（主耍足银行和供应商〉估算其信用风险，从而扩 大其获得佶贷和降低其成木。其主要作用应该足减少佶贷（包栝贸易信贷）的 信息不对称，而不是在股权交易。
此外，鉴于-丨：市公司的股票在股市交妨，有可能•足强制披露对上市公間价 值产生了影响。然而，即使在信用账户造成的强制交易成本也增加公司价值， 我们不能衡景这个效果，因为我们缺乏私人公nj 股权的市场价格。因此，如果 没有一个强制性披露帐n 的佶息，我们只能渴望建立一个综合指标，以成木和 效益开明的定性库存。
最后，强制性的财务披露在经济增长中犮挥关键作用，因为它是为了 “保 护”均投资者和馈权人的交易的公司法律制度的重耍组成部分。强制性的财务 披露起着经济增长的关键作用，金融犮展是经济增长的重要因素。人多数硏宄 集中于上市公司在股票市场的交易上, 但类似的索赔, 有关私营公司，主要考 虑到对信贷成本的证据。在经济上，信用额度取决于两个因索：对债务人的质 量提供信息，并在违约的情况下权利的法律制度补助给偾权人。我们在意信息 因索的可用性，经验证椐显示，信贷供应量增长时，当银行对债务人分莩更多 的信息和信贷登记时，质量提高。肴来，更好的质量和债权人知道债务人的潜 在纪录，降低信贷交易成本，可能是因为既提高了债务人激励和逆卯选择更容 易避免。正如我们将
肴到的，披露的帐户锒主要的原因足它允许佶用风险改进 评估为个人交易，银行和宏观调控。 竞争扭曲
帐户信息披蔣会导致私人成本的披跞，使事务所通知其竞争对f •，这可能 扭曲竞争。然而，似乎不太可能大多小公司都参」•』_。至少，这呰成本显然比现 在普遍耍求对从上〗丨/公司披露的小。公幵申报的与该年度账户披落相比较将足 一个冇用的影响。例如，一个研宄项R 被取消。然而，并非由欧洲委员会审议 的微型和小型公司在这一点上都苻疑闷。由于其规模和市场集中和苻区别的存 在，中型甚至大型私营公司对此披露到是相当敏感。 投资者可占有优势
公司账户披辂还使贸妨伙伴和第二方公司受益。本i!f 探讨哪鸣足可受益的 披露公司。
披露者和他的合作伙伴
账户信息披露给公司贸易伙伴带来好处，减少它们之间的信息不对称：账 户信息披露使公司的投资者了解公司的财政状况和企业盈利能力^这种佶息不 对称的减少，尤其体现在公司未来愤务的价值：客户购买耐用消费品，各方在 公司特定资产，少数股东，特别足贸易和佥融债权人的投资。可以理解的，更 透明的公司己经犮现要支付偾务和股权资本成本较低。
此外，勾合同当事人移交给他们的个人通信相比，披跞的账户可能更可靠， 只軒那呰谁要求他们明确各方成本更低。信用足闽为申请获衍„独立第二方(登 记）的帐n 提交公司，如己经提出帐户不能被修改和今后的帐户将要与过去提 出的-致。成本的降低，因为它不再需耍他们提供大量的贸易偾权人，偾权人 和潜在的第三方将不洱有耍求的帐h 交付给他们。 个人披露作为替代公幵披露
为一种方案，由欧盟委员会提出的对偾权人耍求借款人的财务报表。这个 解决方案足布问题的，这足因为往往苻两个以上当事方的交易。
提供的信息在一对一的互动，以较少的一方往往比提供可信在市场上提交 给所轲潜在的各方。这足在银行给予的普遍做法，作为第一步，检资编写的报 告对贷款按业务应用程序（通常包牯特别适合财务报表）。这种信息不对称的减 少，尤其体现在交幼对公司未来愤务的价值：客户购买耐用消费品，各方在公 司特定资产，少数股东，特别足贸妫和金融愤权人的投资。可以理解的，更透 明的公司己经发现耍支付偾务和股权资本成本较低。
此外，耍求对敏感信息的合同当琪人并不一定足明智的谈判策略，因为它 可能会破坏佶任，这可能耑耍适应未来的交埸。它可能会迫使更多的交妫的IE 式tt 和法律性。这似乎足特别里耍时按商业交埸，其中有许多需耍迠应未来的 副产品佶贷决策。另一方面，为保障明确締约扣对较常见的和非商业交易的信 用接受，较少的修改是必要的。 外部映射
每一个公司披露其帐户，它使第二方受益，难以补偿披滿的公司^对个别 公司的资料汇总，即使很少，是衧价值的佶用佶息机构，以提商准确性和他们 的信用评级模型的预测能力：为分祈师和投资者，在资木和企业之间分配产业 时，它允许他们做对比分析：在分析产业时，考虑竞争者和竞争对r •的投资者 悄况；在作出决定时，考虑监管机构和决策者的悄况；对丁•中央银行，正确评 佔负债经济和银行的稳健水平；做好工作的研宂人员猓至经验《^
人们可以预期，无论足在微观和宏观层次的其他经济主体，这些影响都将 间接受益。特别是信用信息，银行监育和闺民经济核算。 外部信用信息
佥融信息机构产生的报告戟柯各种信息，这足评价企业的信用使用。这呰 报告，可能足根据丨' j 定义的客户端的需求而定，通常包拈数年的帐户为在公司 登记和公司的股东和法定代表人的身份提起。此外，不仅对公司，而ji 也为个 别公司，如果有的话，报告还包括，存关以前拖欠的负面信息，如贸易和金融 偾权人和法院存档，以及联系方式和对公司的新闻片段。作为一个总结，他们 也可以提供信用评级，甚至楚违约概率的估计。
公司登记备案的决算是信丨丨】报告的重耍组成部分，以及闹扰的其他信息来 源的问题。对苻关佶贷违约的负面佶息卓卉的依赖加剧了信用评估的质量，金 融机构往往不愿分皁愦务人的枳极信息。此外，即使丼卒安排取决于既定的金 融机构的合作，这对竞争构成严甫威胁。 br 经济核算的外部性
W 家经济建设的财务帐许多中央银fj •在•定程度丨•. 依赖II. •金融公司的 财务报表，主耍产少其金融业务的佶息。一呰闽家己经制定了具体的数据库的 帐R ，而公司主动送CJ 己的帐户，以换取他们的特权获得工业和佶息获取的经 济总量。
然而，大公司更倾向于参々账户信息披露，小公司参々较少。这就需耍补 充与小公司的帐冃0己的数据库分析。
如何平衡企业成本和效益？
决策者D 愿作出决定可能会偏离合理的最伸贸易销S 成木和效益，主耍冇 两个原因：在信息不对称的结构可用和存在外部性。此外，这种利益平衡成本 也可能受到阻碍，决策者理性偏离。 信息不对称约束
在信息不对称的情况下，为更好地了解各方可能倾向〒丨丨丨愿披辦信息，他 们推断朴丨应反应，撤消其合作或采取预防措施。对一拽由私人公司丨丨丨愿披谿信 息存在的证据提供原囡，例如，由信用评级机构的共同做法，作为一种信用指 标使ffl —个事实，即公刁保留了各种登记注册为最新信息：从其在电话目录中 的上市公司。
知情各方不得披羝这些信息，但足，当出现以下假设时不成立：当披露是 吊贵的，"J ■能足不了解情况的交幼双方将保密，从最坏的推断并不一定提供足 够的诱因透露：出于同样的原因，不公幵的，类似的结果出现时，当告知当琳 人充分知情々否：当不足所ff 不知情各方了解的佶息，他们的现解不足可能限 制了好的企业和公司披露的权益在一份保密的平衡中； 当告知当褀人不能披露所苻资料(例如，K 为它必须编制财务报表若干套采用 不间的原则，这将非常昂贵〉，规则限制披露的选择将增加披露的信息的价值。
就财务报表披滿私人小公司，这鸣假设其中二个不成立，阻碍D 愿披菇。 首先，信息披露足昴资的，这可能阻止由非公幵发出的信号自愿披露，造成混 乱。第二，它足公共知识，公司财务报表，他们使用己的管理，所以第二个 假设不成立。三足相当一部分市场参与者可能不完全明白的帐第叫，强制 性的会计原则是需耍酌情增加，这限制了信息的价值。
外部性内在化的难点
对r •次优披辦:gi 要的原闲足外部性的存在：企业缺乏D 愿披辦信息的激 励机制，因为它们内部化一些，但并非所有披露社会效益々此外，使用电脑和 互联网己增加使得可能聚集在帐丨1和分犮的资料，更便立的数山•万用户，及时 的信息，上数这鸬外部闽索的价值。